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"We departfrom a great tradition......
-DoUGLAs,

J., DISSENTING.1

USTICES MURPHY AND RUTLEDGE died, were buried, were
mourned-and were replaced. Justice Douglas was absent most of the
term with an injury. On October 3, 1949, at the first session of the new
term, Chief Justice Vinson concluded his memorial remarks with the
words, "Saddened by our losses but inspired by the examples of devotion
to duty which Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge have provided for us, we turn to the work before us."' By the first opinion day, the
bar knew that the "work before us" consisted, in substantial part, of
rejecting the work and the philosophy of the late justices.
Since chance had spun the wheel, it was appropriate that the symbol of
change should be a pin-ball machine. It was a super pin-ball machine,
product of one Gibbs, putting together several of the common games so
that players could compete simultaneously, without having to wait their
* This article is the fourth in an annual series and is written in part for the legal, social,
and economic historians of the future who may find it useful to have a contemporary view of
the work of the Supreme Court at the last term. The preceding articles on the 1946 Term, i
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (i947); 1947 Term, i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1948); and 1948 Term, i7

Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i (1949), will hereafter be cited by the date of the Term, i.e., 1946 Term

article.
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. The author had a remote connection as counsel with two cases referred to in passing in this article, and participated on an amicus brief in
connection with one of the segregation cases discussed below.
t Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 840 (195o) (apropos
a patent point).
1338 U.S. VIII, Ii (1949).
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turn. A district court and the ninth circuit had held this small-bore "flash
of genius" worthy of a patent as a combination. On March 28, 1949, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.2
It takes four votes to grant certiorari. We shall never know; but if it
could be proved, it would seem a safe wager that those four were Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. It was their kind of case.
On October

12,

1949, the matter was argued, and on November 7, 1949,

the first decision day, it was decided. With Murphy and Rutledge gone,
and Douglas away, the case no longer presented enough of an intellectual
problem to the Court to warrant discussion. A brief per curiam upheld the
invention and its claims, with only justice Black dissenting. 3
The docket of decided cases was a small one, perhaps the smallest in a
century. Of the 94 opinions, two clearly overruled opinions of justice
Murphy.4 A law review article is no substitute for a seance, and this next
observation of course cannot be proved; but it is very probable that at
least twelve more cases would have come to opposite results if Murphy,
Rutledge and Douglas had been voting,- and it is quite possible that four
more might have reached different conclusions.6 These cases constitute
twenty per cent of the year's decisions; significantly, most of these cases
resulted in restrictions of civil rights. They were the most colorful part of a
term otherwise only rarely spectacular. Perhaps two dozen opinions, the
smallest number since this series of articles was begun, are of sufficient
general importance to have any lasting significance, though a vital free
speech case and the segregation cases are enough to make the term memorable.7 The principal spectacle of 1949-1950 was Leviathan-turning.
Faulkner v. Gibbs, 17 o F. 2d 34 (C.A. 9, 1948), cert. granted, 336 U.S. 935 (1949).
3 338 U.S. 267 (1949).
4 Darr

v. Burford, 339 U.S.

200 (950);

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (195o).

s American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (95o); Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (95o); Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (i95o); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 68o (1950); United States v.

Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (i95o); United States ex rel. 'Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521
(1950); United States v. Fleischmann, 339 U.S. 349 (950); United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (950); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (ig5o); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S.
338 (1949).
6 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Faulkner v.
Gibbs, 17 o F. 2d 34 (C.A. 9th, 1948), cert. granted 336 U.S. 935 (i949); Graver Tank & Mfg.

Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S. 605 (i95o); Manufacturer's Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S.
304 (1949).
7For

citations, consult the section immediately below,
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I. HIGH SPOTS OF THE YEAR

The five major opinions of the year all involved civil rights, though two
also involved labor relations. Three of the five, each by Chief Justice Vinson, were of particular significance. The first of the major Vinson opinions
was American CommunicationsAss'n v. Douds,8 upholding the non-Communist affidavit provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. The opinion would not
have been so important were it not for its dicta, which undermines much
that Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes and their successors had done for thirty
years to develop the "clear and present danger" test. This was the first
major defeat for freedom of speech in the Supreme Court since Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, coming to the Court in 193o, had reversed the trend of the Taft, Sutherland, Sanford Court.
The other two major Vinson opinions involved segregation in graduate
education. In Sweatt v. Painter,9 and McLaurinv. Oklahoma,0 a unanimous
Court declined the invitation of counsel for the Negroes to reconsider the
entire legal basis of segregation in the United States; but it did hit hard
against segregation in graduate education by requiring that separate
schools be truly equal. The nature of legal education is such, held the
Court, that segregation in that field cannot be permitted at all, and when
a Negro student is admitted to a white university, he may not be subjected to any racial distinctions. The dicta here, and in a related case involving dining car segregation," may foretell an eventual reconsideration
of the fundamentals of "separate but equal."
The decline and fall of Thornhill v. Alabama,2 and with it the First
Amendment as a serious protection of picketing, was completed this year
in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke.'3 The majority's opinion, by Justice Frankfurter, reduced the right of peaceful picketing to a
case-by-case determination of whether, in all the circumstances, it is
"reasonable" to allow that conduct. The judgment to be made becomes
so complex that a strike is scarcely likely to survive the determination by a
hierarchy of courts.
Last of the most significant cases is United States v. Rabinowitz.14 For
several years, one of the hardest fought Supreme Court issues has been
the extent of the "search and seizure" limitation upon police conduct.
Two years ago the Court required a search warrant whenever it was reasonably possible to get one. In Rabinowitz, a majority opinion by Justice
9 339 U.S. 382

(1950).

9.339 U.S. 629 (1950).

11Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
"2310 U.S. 88 (i94o).
13 339 U.S. 470 (i95o).

10339

14

U.S. 637 (1950).

339 U.S. 56 (ig5o).
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Minton overruled that precedent. A legal pendulum, which had already
been swinging crazily, thus took another wild swerve, though, it will be
argued below, not necessarily a particularly undesirable one.
Taking these opinions apart individually may obscure the dominant
motif of the year, which can be seen only in a totality. The segregation
cases were unanimous. In the fifteen other civil rights cases this year the
new Court divided. In fourteen of these cases, it rejected the claimed
right. In numerous other civil rights cases, it denied certiorari. This broad
jump to the right in respect to civil liberties was the most important new
development of the year.15
II. R:EGuLATioN

OF LABOR AND BuSINss
LABOR

The most important labor cases involved picketing and state legislation limiting the right to strike. There were, as always, lesser but still significant matters, the most colorful of which was a spanking for the fifth
circuit for allegedly giving too little attention to the mandates of the labor
laws.
It might not have appeared so clearly as a spanking but for the dissent.
As everyone knows, the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act look a little less demanding to the fifth circuit, covering
Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, than they
do to most of the rest of the courts of the country. Ten years ago, the
Labor Board brought to the Court a petition for certiorari from the
fifth circuit alleging that that court had consistently failed "to give effect
to the provisions of the Act that the findings of the Board as to facts, if
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." The Supreme Court reversed
the fifth circuit in a manner which made clear its desire for that circuit
to fall into line.,,
But it takes more than one admonition to convince the fifth circuit's
able, colorful, tenacious Judge Hutcheson, and this year the Board filed
five more petitions for certiorari telling the ten year old story over again.
The Court granted two of them and reversed, in opinions tactfully assigned to Justice Clark, most recent appointee from that circuit. 7 The
15For full discussion and citations on matters summarized in this paragraph, see the discussion on civil rights, p. 20 infra.
16NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Co., 309 U.S. 2o6 (i94o).
X7NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563 (195o), and a companion case, NLRB v.
Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950). The three denied were NLRB v. Atlanta Metallic Casket
Co., NLRB v. Massey Gin & Machine Works, Inc., and NLRB v. Wilson & Co., 338 U.S. 9io

(1g9o).
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subject matter of the cases is too routine to be worth statement, and the
certioraris would not have been worth granting if nothing but the immediate cases were involved.
justice Clark made no reference to the "special problem" of the fifth
circuit, treating the cases on the merits. But Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, maximized the circuit's rebuke by protesting it:
Since the record permits, we ought to attribute to a Court of Appeals not a willful disregard of principle, and, as such, an abuse of discretion, but an honest desire to get light
on happenings after the Board's orders relevant to its duties as a court of equity.
Courts of Appeals are human institutions. By attributing to the Court of Appeals an
abusive exercise of discretion when the record may fairly be otherwise interpreted, we
...needlessly rebuke that court ...is

Another matter with which the Court had dealt before, and on which
it was now time to become peremptory, was the matter of discrimination
by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen against Negro firemen. The
Court had previously made it so clear that the Brotherhood could not,
under the Railway Labor Act, enter into agreements under which Negroes
were permanently assigned to the poorest jobs, 9 that, as the Court put it,
this year's case presented "a continuing and willful disregard of rights
which this Court in unmistakable terms has said must be accorded Negro

firemen." The Brotherhood hoped it had some procedural wrinkles as defenses against an injunction suit, particularly a defense under the NorrisLaGuardia Act. This the Court thrust aside in a word, saying, "If, in
spite of the Virginia, Steele and Tunstallcases, there remains any illusion
that under the Norris-LaGuardia Act the federal courts are powerless to
enforce those rights, we dispel it now.'

'20

Far more important was the clarification of ambiguities arising from a
decision the term before, InternationalUnion, UA W v. WERB,2 involving the power of states to limit the right to strike. The Wagner and TaftHartley Acts recognize the employee's right "to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining." May states put limits
of their own on those concerted activities?
In the UAW case of the preceding term, the Court had upheld a Wisconsin prohibition of a strike method which the majority found similar to
the sit-down strike. The union there had argued that Congress had filled
isNLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 576 (19so).
9 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (x944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).

2o Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S.
21336 U.S. 245 (1949).

232

(1949).
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this legislative field, and that the states could not devise new limits of
their own. It was unclear from the earlier opinion whether the Court had
upheld Wisconsin (a) because this kind of strike was not, due to its peculiar nature, within the federal protection of "concerted activities" at
all; or (b) because the state was empowered to put such limitations as it
liked on the right to strike despite the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts.
As the situation was summarized in the article at the close of the last
term: "The point is vital. If labor activities are outside the scope of major
constitutional protections, and if such labor activities are now also removed from the protective covering of the Taft-Hartley Act, then states
may do as they will with labor's 'concerted activities.' The showdown
may come upon review of recent state laws forbidding strikes in public
utilities, which, like any other strikes, are also 'concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining.' New Jersey and Wisconsin courts
have recently held that under the instant decision the states are free to
take public utility strikes out of the protection of [the Acts] by declaring
such activities 'illegal.' Even more significantly, the Supreme Court of
Michigan has interpreted the UAW decision to uphold the requirements
of Michigan law that strikes be approved by a majority vote of all employees in a bargaining unit. But it is extremely doubtful that the UAW
decision, although ambiguous, meant the Taft-Hartley Act protection to
be dependent to this extent upon state predilections."'This year the Michigan case just referred to came to the Supreme
Court, which made very clear that it had upheld Wisconsin the year before only because the conduct there involved, due to its sit-down quality,
fell "outside the protection of the federal act." Otherwise, said the Court,
"None of these sections [of the federal acts] can be read as permitting
concurrent state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress
''
occupied this field and closed it to state regulation. 23
Words could scarcely be clearer. They say that, where interstate commerce is involved, states cannot put limitations on "peaceful strikes for
higher wages." Nonpeaceful strikes, or strikes for other purposes, remain
to be argued about.
Fourteen years ago in Senn. v. Tile-Layers Protective Union, Justice
Brandeis said, "Members of the union might, without special statutory
authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for
1948 Term article, 8-9.

"3Int. Uniqn,

UAW, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
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freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. ' ' 24 Exactly
what that passage meant in its context in 1937 is arguable, but for a time
it did not seem to matter. In Thornhill v. Alabama,2s three years later,
the Court refused to permit a state to enjoin all peaceful picketing in a
conventional labor dispute on the theory that picketing was a form of
speech protected by the principles of freedom. A few years later, the
Court restated the Senn dictum as a categorical proposition, ignoring all
questions of a special meaning that it might have had in its context.26
The dictum thus passed from an aside to a flat statement of the fight, as
a constitutional matter, to "make known the facts of a labor dispute."
The principle of law which thus evolved was as important as picketing
itself, because it was widely, though perhaps carelessly, understood to insulate peaceful picketing from state control.27 The Thornhillcase has been
invoked hundreds of times in strikes.
That the Supreme Court had never meant to push the immunity of
picketing as far as some had thought became apparent a year ago in the
case of Giboney v. Empire Storage &"Ice Co.21 There the union sought to
compel an employer to commit certain practices which were in violation
of the state anti-trust laws. The Court held that the picketing, though
peaceful, had no protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when it
was directed toward an illegal purpose. The Giboney case thus opened
wide the possibility that the ruling of Thornhill could be largely undercut
if labor objectives were, with due ceremony of law, made illegal.
Two cases this year so widened the entries to this zone of illegality as
9
to leave very little of Thornhill. In Building Service Employees v. Gazzam,'
all the employees of a particular employer had, in a free and fair election,
voted not to join a building service union. The union thereupon began
picketing the employer to induce him to force his employees into the
union. A Washington state court enjoined the picketing.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by justice Minton, applied the principle of the Giboney case, and referred to two categories of labor conduct:
first, acts which are "an abuse of the right to picket," and, second, "acts
24301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937).
2s31o U.S. 88 (1940).
26

Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos,

27For brief

320

U.S.

293, 295

(1943).

reference to the leading cases, consult 1948 Term article, 5 et seq.
2 336 U.S. 490 (r949), noted in 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 7o (1949).

21339 U.S.

532

(1950).
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which are a means of peaceful and truthful publicity. ' ' 3 The measure of
difference was whether the conduct desired of the employer was consonant
with "the public policy of the state." In Giboney the employer could not
comply with the request without violating provisions of the state criminal
law. In Gazzam, no criminal provision was involved, but the employer
could not force his employees into the union without violating the general
principle of state legislation that employees should have uncoerced free
choice in their selection of bargaining representatives. The absence of
criminal sanctions was immaterial since they are only one evidence of
"public policy," and other evidence would do as well.
What Giboney and Gazzam had in common was that the public policy
which the employer would violate if he yielded to the pickets was to be
found in explicit legislation of the state. The case of InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Hankesz took a far longer step away from Thornhill
because no legislation was involved.32 In Hanke, another Washington
case, the teamsters had picketed peacefully to compel a seller of used cars
and his employees, all members of his family, to join the union. The ultimate purpose had been to win compliance with a union rule against weekend and evening work, since if the small independents were open at those
hours it was difficult for the union to maintain its standards elsewhere.
The Washington court enjoined the picketing.
This time the "public policy" was made by the supreme court of
Washington, with no legislative support. That court, in this case, said
that the union's interest "is far outweighed by the interests of individual
proprietors and the people of the community as a whole, that individual
and little business men and property owners shall be free from dictation
as to business policy. ....,,33
In upholding the injunction justice Frankfurter, for the three justices
who agreed with him, cut the earlier picketing decisions to their barest
bones. The Senn case was pushed back to its facts and the passage quoted
above was treated as dictum not to be read in the light of subsequent interpretations put upon it. Three subsequent cases were reduced to their
facts with an observation that it is "the Court's duty to restrain general
expression in opinions in earlier cases to their specific context."34
so Ibid.

31339 U.S. 470 (,950).
32See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 46o (195o), in which the same majority as
in the Hanke case upheld a California injunction against picketing, the Justices who dissented
in Hanke concurring separately.
33

Ibid., at 477.

34 Ibid.,

at 480 n. 6.
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What, then, is the ruling which emerges? Justice Frankfurther here
transfers to the picketing field his entire theory of due process of law, that
all state restraints are valid which have any rational suppokt. 3s He states
his decision in stating his conclusion: "[W]e cannot conclude that Washington, in holding the picketing in these cases to be for an unlawful object,
has struck a balance so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people
that it must be found an unconstitutional choice.' 36 Justices Minton,
Reed and Black dissented.
The majority opinion leaves little effect for the Thornhill case. Labor
disputes are in their nature so volatile that they must be subjected to
very clear rules. Were the rule that peaceful picketing must be permitted when it does not require an employer to violate a clearly stated
statute, labor could understand and the police could enforce it. When,
however, the pickets and the police are supposed to guess whether or not
the conduct desired by the pickets of the employer is (a) compatible with
a not-yet announced state policy which (b) "is consistent with rooted
tradition of a free people," the "rule" can satisfy only those who appraise
law at the level of verbalisms on the books rather than in terms of its
practical consequences in human affairs.
All this makes a difference only if picketing makes a difference. Perhaps
it does not. Picketing is vanishing from all the basic industries except for
token purposes, because where a union is substantially the whole of the
labor force, it is easier and just as effective to strike by staying home
rather than by carrying signs. Picketing today is very nearly a phenomenon of the direct consumer-contact trades-the bakers, the launderers, the milk distributors, the restaurants, or, in this case, the used car
dealers."s Data as to the quantity of picketing currently being carried on
are not available. While it is small, relative to the total volume of organized labor, it is not insubstantial. To the extent that picketing is practiced, this decision, turning the prerogative of enjoining picketing back to
the state courts for substantially any reason of labor policy which may
appeal to them, is an important development in labor relations.
This case is but another signpost on a judicial road toward governmental control of labor relations: three years ago, the Lewis case;38 last
year, the validation of anti-closed shop restriction and the first peaceful
3SSee the concurring opinions of the Justice in Malinski v. New York, 304 U.S. 401 (1945),
and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
3'339 U.S. 477, 478 (I95o).
37 Those are the trades involved in several of the series of Supreme Court cases.
3SUnited Mine Workers v. United States, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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picketing limitations;39 this year the Gazzam and Hanke cases and a
refusal by a majority even to hear the complaint against the fabulous
fine put on the United Mine Workers. 4' If organized labor ever was the
4
favorite of the judiciary, it is so no longer. 1
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE

There were no broadly significant trade regulation cases this year. The
only exception may be Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc.42 Hazeltine is a radio patent-holding corporation, which
licenses its hundreds of patents en bloc, but which requires the licensee
to pay royalties on all sales of radio parts regardless of the extent to which
it actually uses the Hazeltine patents. Hazeltine had licensed to this defendant 570 patents and 200 applications, of which defendant actually
used ten. In a royalty suit, the licensee contended (a) that the entire
agreement was void because of the system of charging royalties on sales
of non-patented articles; and (b) regardless of the first point, that the
patents were invalid. The licensor replied that the payment system did
not void the licensing agreement, and that a patent licensee was estopped
from challenging the validity of patents. Justice Minton for the majority
upheld the licensor on both points.
Petitioner contended that the payments arrangement violated the principle of the "tie-in" cases. Those cases had held illegal requirements of
the purchase of unpatented goods as a condition of obtaining a patent
license; they forbade the requirement that the licensee refrain from competition with the licensor; and they held illegal the granting of one patent
license conditioned upon acceptance of another. 43 The Hazeltine case was
obviously none of those cases. The licensor did not compel the licensee to
purchase unpatented goods, or to refrain from competition, or to use
39 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949)
(closed shop); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (picketing).
40Int. Union, United Mine Workers v. United States, 177 F. 2d 29 (1949), cert. den. 338
U.S. 871 (1949), Black, Reed, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting.
41 Other important labor cases of the year were: (a) Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB,
338 U.S. 355 (1949), rejecting the so-called "Rutland Court" doctrine of the Board and holding that the Board could not, in effect, set aside a closed shop agreement of such long duration
that it patently no longer reflected the wishes of the actual employees. For extended discussion, consult Koretz, Rejection of the Rutland Court Doctrine, i Syracuse L. Rev. 425 (1950);
(b) Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (Ig5o), holding the Fair Labor Standards Act
applicable to private operators of government owned munitions plants operated under costplus contracts.
42 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
43 The

cases are collected in notes i, 2, and 3 to the opinion of the Court. Ibid., at 83o-3i.
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licenses he would otherwise not want. On the other hand, what the
licensor did require is very similar to the previous tie-ins. Since the licensee must pay a royalty based on total sales regardless of whether he
used the licensor's patents, there is a strong incentive to the licensee not
to use someone else's patents, for which he would in effect be paying a
second time.
Since the law would have to expand somewhat beyond any existing
precedent to render illegal this type of license agreement, the case becomes something of a sample of how the new Court decides when the law
will expand. The majority opinion of Justice Minton begins by finding
that the conduct complained of is not squarely within any existing case.
It proceeds, "This royalty provision does not create another monopoly;
it creates no restraint of competition upon the legitimate grant of the
patent." 44 Since the latter half-sentence covers the only point in issue, it
in effect combines the ruling and the reasoning of the case.
On the issue of whether a licensee should be able to attack the validity
of a patent, there has for a long time been an earnest, if minority, view
that licensees should be allowed to challenge the validity and that any
case to the contrary should be overruled. As Justice Douglas said in dissent in this case, "No other person than the licensee will be interested
enough to challenge them. He alone will be apt to see and understand the
basis of their legality." 5 To this Justice Minton responded, "The general rule is that the licensee under a patent license agreement may not
challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for royalties due
' '4 6
under the contract. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U. S. 310.
This and the other patent cases of the year are only straws in the wind, 47
but they suggest the tentative hypothesis that the new Court will stick
much closer to the strict boundaries of the precedents in the law of trade
regulation than did its predecessor.48 Each of the precedents which the
Court distinguished in respect to tie-ins had themselves created new law
44 Ibid.,

at 833.
at 840.
46 Ibid., at 836.
47 Faulkner v. Gibbs was discussed in the text at note 2 supra. Consult also Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S. 6o5 (195o), giving a most liberal interpretation to the
"doctrine of equivalents." This year's cases have created a vivid impression, apparent from
informal observations collected among lower courts, that the Supreme Court has now abandoned the "tough" patent anti-trust policy of Stone, Black, and Douglas, and has moved
toward the "soft" policy of Frankfurter and Jackson. In recent years the Court has barely
and ineffectively held in check the unlimited enthusiasm of the Patent Office for giving a
patent on almost anything. For discussion, consult 1948 Term article, 19-24.
48 Note the manner in which, in the instant case, the Court stops at the exact edges of the
precedents.
45 Ibid.,
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when they were decided. The new Court apparently wishes that process
of development to stop.
OTHER PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS

As usual, there was a miscellaneous variety of business problems,
largely routine. The principal bankruptcy case was ManufacturersTrust
Co. v. Becker, 49 involving an application of the "Deep Rock" doctrine.
The issue, put generally, is the degree of scrutiny the courts will exercise
over transactions between directors and their corporations on the basis of
which the directors make claims in bankruptcy. In the Deep Rock case,
Taylor v. Standard Gas Co.,-" the Court had held that the bankruptcy
court should exercise equitable powers to subordinate the claims as creditor of a dominant shareholder who had mismanaged and underfinanced
the corporation. The underlying principle was expanded in Pepper v.
Litton in an apparently careful and deliberate dictum:
A director is a fiduciary.... So is a dominant or controlling stockholder ...their
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their
contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the goodfaith of the transactionbut also to show its inherentfairness....-51

In the Becker case, the corporation became insolvent in 1942. During
the three years following, relatives and associates of one of the directors
purchased sixty per cent of an outstanding bond issue at from three to
fourteen per cent of face value. In 1946, the corporation filed a petition
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and under the ultimate arrangement, these bonds were to be paid off at forty per cent of face value.
Other claimants contended that the director's associates should be paid
off only to the extent of their actual investment.
The majority opinion, by justice Clark, quietly appears to abandon
the Pepper rule.52 The Court did not require the director's associates to
meet any burden of proof, but rather "intuited" that "on this record the
probability that an actual conflict of loyalties arose from the opportunity to purchase.., is not great enough to justify the exercise of equity
49.338 U.S. 304 ('949), noted in 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 675 (x95o).
so 306 U.S. 307 (1939).

s',308 U.S. 295 , 306 (1939).

s2The principle had previously been struck a glancing blow in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 8o (1943), holding that neither Pepper nor any other "principles of equity announced by
courts" (at 87) would support an SEC ruling that directors and related interests which had
purchased preferred stock pending reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act were limited to their purchase price; but cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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jurisdiction." 53 No "burden" whatsoever ,was placed on the director.
Since in these matters, only the insiders are likely to have enough information to carry a burden of proof, the placing of the burden is a vital
factor in the disposition of cases of alleged improprieties prior to bankruptcy. Under Pepper, there was some chance of catching up with the
slick wrongdoer as well as the obvious wrongdoer; the Becker case returns
to putting a premium on the wrongdoer's adroitness.
Members of the law teaching profession will be particularly interested
to note that Professor Walton Hamilton, recently "retired" to active
practice after many years of commenting on the Supreme Court, this
year argued his first case in that tribunal. As has been the case before
with Professor Hamilton, his cause was stronger than his precedents. In
the Secretary of Agric. v. Central Roig Refining Co.54 the ultimate issue
was the validity of an order of the Secretary sharply limiting the refining
of sugar in Puerto Rico. The order, Puerto Rico contended, was engrafted
on to the general national sugar quota system. That territory is permitted
to grow sugar, but it is not permitted to refine nearly as much as it produces. Desperate for manufacturing enterprise to relieve its terrible economic circumstances, the territory is anxious to increase the volume of its
refining. Alleging that the federal government could not permanently
keep Puerto Rico in a depressed state by forbidding it to engage in its
most obvious manufacture, Professor Hamilton and others for Puerto
Rico challenged either the government's order or the act on which it was
based. Unfortunately from the Puerto Rican point of view, the Court
could find nothing in the Constitution except the due process clause
which might restrict the power of Congress in this respect and the majority opinion of Justice Frankfurter held that the sugar licensing system
of which the Puerto Rican restrictions are a part was not so "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or unfair" as to violate that clause of the Constitution.55
Of the remaining matters of concern to the business community, the
year's developments in respect to eminent domain and to tideland oil
stand out.
"1338 U.S.

304, 313 (1950).

s"338 U.S. 604 (195o).
55 justice Black dissented on other grounds. Episode in oral argument: Mr. Hamilton had
stepped slightly to the left of counsel's lectern, and the Chief Justice, fearing that Justices at

the right end of the Bench might not be able to hear clearly, said, "Mr. Hamilton, would you
mind stepping to the right?" Mr. Hamilton, complying, replied, "Certainly not, may it please
your honor, I'm quite in the habit of being asked to step to the right."
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a) Eminent domain.
Aside from due process, few matters are as completely thrown into the
lap of the judiciary by our constitution as is the law of eminent domain.
The few words in the Fifth Amendment which provide that private property shall not be taken for public use "without just compensation" have
been the foundation of a tremendous legal structure. That structure was
extended this year.
Determination of the standard of payment for articles condemned in
war time presented serious problems. Two years ago, the Court saw the
question of whether the ceiling price should be the standard of value in
war time and skittered away from it. 56 This year, in United States v. Commodity Trading Corp., the question recurred- 7 The company during the
war owned a very large share of the American supply of pepper and
declined to sell to the government at the ceiling price. The government
condemned.
Opposition to making the ceiling the "value" lies primarily in the fact
that the ceiling price is set with no necessary regard to the highly particularized factors which would go into an eminent domain value judgment.
On the other hand, if large suppliers could force the government to condemn for more than the ceiling price, in large areas there might be nothing
left of the ceilings.~5
The Company contended, and the Court of Claims held, that one of the
elements of value for eminent domain purposes should be "retention
value" or the value which represented the right to hold the goods, if need
be, until after the war. The argument was supported by the contention
that the Price Control Act had not meant to compel sales by unwilling
vendors.
The Court divided on other points but there was unanimity in the
result of Justice Black's disposal of this contention. "Retention value,"
he said, assumes something which does not exist, namely the right to
retain as against the government. The power of eminent domain, one
s

6

United States v. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1948), summarized briefly, 1947 Term article,

13 n. 49.
S7 339 U.S. 121 (1950). In the third footnote to the opinion, the Court noted in passing that
Congress has power, if it wishes, to determine rates of "just compensation" and that an Act so
doing would have to be reviewed on the same-and no stricter-basis as any other statute
alleged to violate the Constitution. The note thus rejected dicta denying Congress any power
in the premises in Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
58 For discussion of some of the problems presented in the context of one industry, see Nathanson and Hyman, Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat Regulations,
42 Ill. L. Rev. 584 (1947).
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which government is not capable of relinquishing, is one as against which
there can be no right to retain. As for the choice of the measure of value,
Justice Black said, "We think the congressional purpose and the necessities of a war time economy require that ceiling prices can be accepted as
the measure of just compensation, so far as that can be done consistently
with the objectives of the Fifth Amendment." 5 9 If the imposition of ceiling prices would, because of some peculiar circumstances, be unfair to a
particular person, that person must sustain "the burden of proving special conditions and hardships peculiarly applicable to it."1°
In two other eminent domain cases the Court was again confronted with
the perpetually perplexing problem of the determination of the standard
of value to be applied to property damages caused by the alteration of
river levels as a result of federal flood control, irrigation, or power developments. As was argued in this article a year ago, this can be an extremely
important question for the future development of public power, and may
be of crucial significance in the development of the Missouri Valley.6
Ultimate questions turn on difficult legal theories involving the rights
of riparian owners in flowing waters. A few observations have a safe
basis:
i. Under the rule of United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Co., 6 2 no
person can acquire, except by direct grant from the government, a property interest in the flow of a navigable stream. If improvements have
been made in a navigable stream without government license, they may
be destroyed without cost to the government, and if land is taken along
a navigable stream for a power project, it is to be valued on bases apart
from any claimed right to use the water. In short it cannot be appraised
at the so-called "power value" which could well be the highest value it
might have.
2. These principles were once held not inapplicable to nonnavigable
streams. In United States v. Cress,6 3 it was assumed that the running water of nonnavigable streams could be privately owned. In that case the
level of a nonnavigable stream was raised, destroying the value of an installation in that stream, and the government was required to pay for it.
3. On any theory, for any kind of stream, if the government floods
over the high water mark of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream, the
flooding is regarded as a taking for which the government must make
59.339 U.S. 121, 125 (I950).
6z For discussion, consult 1948 Term article, 13-18.

60 Ibid., at 128.

62229 U.S. 53 (1913)

63 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
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compensation at some value.6 4 The problem of determining that value can

conceivably be caught up in the issues suggested by the two preceding
observations, but some compensation there must be.
Twice before the government has asked the Court to overrule the
Cress case and to eliminate the concept of a special property in nonnavigable streams.'- This year the new Court gave the Cress rule its first new
vitality in many years. Two cases raised the problem. In one, United
States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.,6 6 the issue was whether the government
must make compensation for loss of irrigation water by persons along
nonnavigable streams in the Central Valley Project of California, when
the government diverted the streams. The Court, in an interestingly
written opinion by justice Jackson, cleared the mist which had long
hovered over the source of the government's power to undertake multiple purpose navigation, flood control, irrigation, and power projects. For
years it had been the custom to append those projects to a highly fictional
navigation power deduced from the commerce clause. Justice Jackson
found that the power to "provide for the ...general welfare" gave power
sufficient to cover "large scale projects for reclamation, irrigation or other
control improvement." 6 7 He then escaped the serious constitutional question of the nature of the water rights of riparian owners by a happy finding that as a matter of statutory interpretation of the reclamation laws,
Congress intended that these claims be compensated regardless of any
constitutional prerogative it might have had not to do so.
The second case, on a related subject, United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins.tCo., 'permitted no such easy statutory escape." The claimant owned
land along a nonnavigable creek, the land surface being slightly higher
than the creek's ordinary high water mark. Claimant's land drained into
the creek, and from there into the Mississippi. Operations by the United
States on the Mississippi raised the level of the creek to the high water
mark, thus cutting off the claimant's subsoil drainage. The land was thus
"underflowed."
Justice Burton for four Justices, Justice Clark concurring in the result,
64 United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (i9o3), limited in respects which do not bear on
this proposition in United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592

(1941).
65 The problem was avoided in United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (I943),

and United States v. Willow River Co., 3 24 U.S. 499 (1945).
339 U.S. 725 (1950).
67Ibid., at 738. This was most ingeniously drawn out of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.

(1936), the decision invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
6s 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
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invoked the Cress case and gave judgment for the claimant. Cress was
thus reestablished as a precedent, the dissenting four Justices urging in
vain that it be overruled. The majority divided its analysis into two
questions: first, "Whether the United States, in the exercise of its power
to regulate commerce, may raise a navigable stream to its ordinary high
water mark and maintain it continuously at that level in the interest of
navigation, without liability for the effects of that change upon private
property beyond the bed of the stream"; and second, "Whether the
resulting destruction of the agricultural value of the land affected, without
actually overflowing it, is a taking of private property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment ....

69

The questions are quoted here because, for this reader at least, the
opinion eludes full comprehension, and I hesitate to summarize it for fear
of doing it injustice. The majority's treatment of the second question
seems to eliminate the point of asking the first. The Court accepted as a
fact, under the second question, that the claimant's land had been "invaded by the percolation of the water" and concluded that "whether the
prevention of the use of the land for agricultural purposes was due to its
invasion by water from above or from below, it was equally effective."
The principal cases cited are those mentioned above holding that flooding
requires compensation. 7" In short, in this branch of the opinion, the
Court holds that underflow is one type of flooding and then applies the
conventional rule for compensation in the circumstances.
But those cases are equally applicable to navigable and to nonnavigable
streams. It would therefore seem completely unnecessary to consider
whether the government's power was different over the one type of
stream than over the other, unless something is made to hang on it. An
issue of value, as whether "power value" or "farm value," might depend
on a determination of the Cress question, but here value was stipulated.
The net effect is that the Cress rule appears to be restored and that the
government is to be held liable on a theory of property rights for such
alterations in stream flow as it may make, e.g., in the hundreds of nonnavigable streams in the Missouri Valey.Y1 Since the dissent by Justice
Douglas, joined by Black, Reed, and Minton, did not regard the raising
of the stream level to the high water mark as flooding at all, it necessarily reached the question of the Cress case: "But until today's ruling the
69 Ibid., at 8oo-8oi.
70 For

example, United States v. Lynah, i88 U.S. 445 (19o3).

71The possible consequences in the Missouri Valley are considered in some detail in the
x948 Term article, i3-z8.
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Cress case had been largely destroyed by intervening decisions. I would
complete the process ... "72
b) Tidelands.
Three years ago the Supreme Court held that the United States
rather than California owned the minerals in the lands under the waters
off the coast of that state. 73 This year the issue was whether the same
result should be reached as to the lands off Louisiana and Texas.
The Louisiana case presented no serious issue which had not been
decided in the California case and the Court unanimously gave judgment
for the United States. 74 But Texas raised different questions. Texas had
come into the United States after some years of existence as an independent republic. In return for Texas' retention of its substantial debts
the United States had conceded to it "all the vacant and unappropriated
lands lying within its limits .... "75 Hence, argued Texas, the reservation
in the treaty of annexation gave it special rights to the under-ocean lands.
The precise issue before the court in the Texas case was whether it
should be referred to a special master to take scientific and historical
evidence on the possible meaning of the language of reservation. The
Court held that this was not required and gave judgment for the United
States.
Texas, like other states, entered the United States on an "equal footing" with all other states. This was expressly stipulated in the joint resolution admitting Texas to the Union71 That concept has hitherto been
used to increasethe prerogatives of states by holdings that their sovereign
political rights, including the ownership of river beds, is as great as that of
earlier states. 7 In the Texas case, the government contended that the
"equal footing" clause might be a limitation on a state: "In our view, the
present pertinence of the clause is that it not only gives a new State such
additional governmental rights, powers, and privileges, as may be re72339 U.S. 799, 813-14 (1950)-

United States v. California,

332 U.S. 19 (i947).
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (i95o). The Louisiana case had some newspaper
notoriety when the State took the unusual step of asking for a jury in this Supreme Court
proceeding, a plea quickly rejected on the ground that this was an equity proceeding.
7s 5 Stat. 797, 798 (1845).
76 Ibid., at 797. A petition for rehearing ifled by Texas contends that the joint resolution
offered two alternative methods of admission, and that the "equal footing" clause was not
contained in the alternative in fact used. As the the following discussion shows, if this point
is factually well-taken, the opinion of the Court must be recast; but it may reach the same
result on purely constitutional grounds, without reference to the joint resolution. Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (19xi).
77 Brown v. Grant, ii6 U.S. 207, 212 (1886); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U.S.) 2X2
(1845); Case v. Toftus, 39 Fed. 730 (C.C. Ore., 1889).
7'

74 United

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1949-50

quired to raise it to the level of the previously admitted States, but, at
least in the absence of express preservation of a superior status, it also
cuts down any special privileges, powers, or rights-over and above those
possessed by the other States-which a new State may have possessed
prior to admission because of a unique position, such as Texas' national
'
independence."7
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas (Reed, Minton, and Frankfurter dissenting), adopted this view.9 It conceded that Texas may have
owned the lands when it came into the Union, but that since, under the
California case, no other state could own the subjacent lands, Texas, to
be on an "equal footing," must have given up whatever rights it had.
The case was decided on motion for summary judgment. Texas, urging
that the case be referred to a special master, emphasized that the case
"involves the largest area of land ever the subject of litigation before an
American Court." ° The Court held the "equal footing" clause so clear
that there was nothing for a master to consider.
The Court appears to concede that, were it not for the "equal footing"
clause, Texas would prevail under the "vacant and unappropriated land"
clause. In other words, these two clauses are in conflict, and one must be
read as a modification of the other. Except for a passing, two-word dictum,
nothing in the precedents suggests that the "equal footing" clause must
necessarily override the "vacant and unappropriated land" clause, instead of being subordinate to it.' Reference to a master might have permitted fuller exploration of what Congress actually contemplated by the
two provisions; but a reading of the briefs of the parties-and Texas filed
a scholarly 240 page brief with a xo5 page appendix-leaves great doubt
that any amount of further evidence would add any substantial "meaning" to the words in issue. Texas argued that "Letters, speeches, and
other documents will show conclusively that no one at the time made any
' but
contention that these lands would not belong to the new State, 'S2
this in reality only further supports the most likely solution, that the
Congress of the i84o's never thought about this problem one way or
another.
78United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (195o), brief for United States at 61-62.

79 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). The opinion of Justice Frankfurter is ambiguous, but it seems to be more a dissent than a concurring opinion and is so treated in this
article.
so United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), brief for Texas at 226.
In Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (19i), the Court said that under the principle
of equality, one state is not "less or greater" than another.
82United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (I950), brief

for Texas at

25, 26.
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III. CIVIL RIGHTs
American civil liberties history, like American economic history, is cyclical. Every twenty to thirty years we experience an economic Depression. Every twenty to thirty years we also experience a civil-liberties
Repression. These cycles do not normally coincide-rather, our Repressions follow about twenty years after our Depressions.
This Repression cycle began with the alien and sedition scare at the
beginning of the I 9 th century and continued to the anti-Masonic movement about 1830, the climax of nativism in the 1850's, the anti-anarchist
frenzy of the i88o's and 1890's, and the Great Red Scare of 1918 to 1927.
As the cold war progressed during 1949-50, the intensity of the current

American Repression mounted. While a frenzy of fear was systematically
whipped up, the task of the judicial historian became progressively more
one of recording the evidence to show whether the judiciary was standing
out against or bowing to the tide.
In these recurring Repressions, neither the Bill of Rights nor the judiciary has ever proved of much immediate significance. Jefferson did not
think they would. In a remarkably penetrating analysis after the Alien
and Sedition Acts, he said:
It is still certain that tho' written constitutions may be violated in moments of passion or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful may again
rally and recall the people: they fix too for the people principles for their political
creed.3
These pendulum swings until recently rarely came before the judiciary,
but, on the basis of limited experience, an hypothesis may be advanced
that courts love liberty most when it is under pressure least; for the Constitution usually yields, as Jefferson thought it would, to repressionist
4
drives8
The Repression decisions of the 1920'S, then so vainly protested by
s3
Jefferson to Dr. Priestly, June 19, 1802, V Documentary Hist. Const. 259-60 (i905).
84"Among liberals, the claim of the Supreme Court to respect as a guardian of civil liberties
and the Bill of Rights has been taken with varying degrees of seriousness. In the last War,
American public opinion displayed an intolerance not out of keeping with the national character. [The reference is to World War I.] It had its comic side, as when sauerkraut was renamed
(unavailingly) 'liberty cabbage,' and a more serious side in the legal and illegal repression of
dissent. For offenses which in the case of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald led to no more serious
penalty than boycott at a golf-club, Mr. Eugene Debs, the leader of the Socialist party, was
sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, and the administration of the Espionage Acts was
(by the standards of those times) very rigorous. Even imperial Germany treated its political
dissenters less severely than did the great Republic. The Supreme Court did not attempt to
limit the legislative excesses of Congress-which might have been less extravagant had the
members of Congress been less tempted to the heresy that whatever was Constitutional was
also right." Brogan, Politics and Law in the United States 91-92 (1941).
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Holmes and Brandeis, stopped as a result of personnel change s The appointments of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts in the places of
Chief Justice Taft and Justice Sanford resulted in the five-to-four decisions reversing the earlier trend. 6 The dying down of the national nervousness in the late twenties eased this development.
Personnel changes in the late forties now reopen the question of whether
we are about to abandon the course begun by the coalescence of Hughes
and Roberts with Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone. It may well be that we
are about to return to the doctrines of the twenties. Prior to 1949, a
breakdown of the Court in terms of enthusiasm for the exertion of judicial
power to maintain civil rights put Justices Murphy and Rutledge at the
left end of the line, with Justices Black and Douglas near them; Justice
Frankfurter far removed toward the center, and Justices Jackson, Reed,
Burton and Chief Justice Vinson on the far right.87 With this year's
replacements, the whole line moved so far to the right that the difference
between Justice Black at the near left and Justice Frankfurter at the center was almost eliminated."' With a frequency amazing only until the
certioraris denied are examined, 9 they were in dissenting agreement.
A group of cases involving aliens suggest the temper of the times.
In the by now famous case of Ellen Knauff, the final appeal turned out
to be not to the Supreme Court but to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.Mrs.
Knauff was a war bride, a German who had emigrated to other parts of
Europe during the Hitler period and who in 1948, having returned to Germany, married an American soldier. When she sought to enter this country, the Immigration Service excluded her without notice or hearing on
the ground that her admission would be "prejudicial to the interests of
the United States." Since there had never been notice, hearing, charges
or findings, no one, with the possible exception of the bureaucrats who
entered the order, have any notion to this day as to why it was entered.
Nothing on the face of Mrs. Knauff's record suggests anything prejudicial.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, Mrs. Knauff raised the question of
whether she must have a hearing before she could be excluded. The Act of
85See Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 285-354 (1941), on the decisions of the
1920's. Prof. Chafee analyzes the results of the personnel changes of 193o at 357 et seq.

86 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Herndon v. Lowry, 3oi U.S. 242 (1937).
87 Consult the civil liberties analyses of the 1946, 1947, and 1948 Term articles.
9 Consult Table i, infra.
89 The new policies concerning the granting of the writ of certiorari are discussed infra, and
in Appendix A.
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June 21, 1941, provides that the President may issue "reasonable rules,
regulations and orders" which are to govern the entrance of aliens during
a period of national emergency. One of the regulations in the pyramid
which grew out of the statute permitted exclusions without hearings. The
ultimate legal issue became whether these regulations were "reasonable,"
particularly in view of the general policy of the War Brides Act, which
was intended to make it easier for soldiers to bring home their wives but
which retained a caveat that the bride must still be "otherwise admissible
under the immigration laws."
The majority opinion by Justice Minton held the regulations reasonable, with Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson dissenting and two
Justices not participating.90 Said the majority, Congress may be as arbitrary about aliens as it wishes, and it need not give the courts the power
of judicial review; in view of the fact that the alien has only a privilege
and not the right of entry, the restrictions were reasonable.
The dissenting opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson spend
very little time on the statute and regulations. As Justice Jackson put it,
"Congress will have to use more explicit language than any yet cited before I will agree that it has authorized an administrative official to break
up the family of an American citizen or force him to keep his wife by becoming an exile."'9
At this point the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,long a militant defender of
individual rights, entered the picture. In a series of editorials it demanded
that Mrs. Knauff be given a hearing. It placed full-page ads in the Washington papers stating the case, and interested Representative Walter of
Pennsylvania in a private bill to admit Mrs. Knauff. Representative
Walter carried that bill through the House. A veteran of i8 years in Congress, and a highly respected conservative, even he was unable to get any
information from the Immigration Service as to what its charges might
be. Mrs. Knauff herself has been kept on Ellis Island on and off for 22
months as of the date of this writing, and the Walter Committee could
see her only by subpoenaing her. The bill went to the Senate where, late
in the 8ist Congress, it appeared to have been blocked by Senate Judi9
ciary Chairman McCarran. 2
Meanwhile, the Knauff case was back in the courts. The Immigration
Service, in a frenzy to be rid of Mrs. Knauff before she could undermine
9o United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (i95o).
9 Ibid., at 551-52.
92 The bulk of the information in this and the succeeding paragraph is taken from St. Louis
Post-Dispatch clippings for which Iam indebted to Mr. Irving Dilliard of that newspaper.
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the nation from her vantage point on Ellis Island, attempted to whisk
her out of the country before Congress could act-and thus investigate.
A new habeas corpus proceeding interrupted this haste. Twenty minutes
before Mrs. Knauff was to be put into an airplane for Europe by the Immigration Service under orders discreetly marked "no publicity," Justice
Jackson issued a new order requiring that the matter should be held in
status quo until new proceedings for certiorari were disposed of. 93 No further action can be taken until fall.
The Knauff case, though it is only one family's tragedy, deserves such
full attention here if it is symbolic of the attitude of the new Court. "The
law," insofar as there is any preponderance, does lean against Mrs.
Knauff. On the other hand, every element of human decency in the case
supports her. That is to say, Congress did give the executive powerwhich it possessed and could give-to be extremely arbitrary in this field;
and perhaps it gave as much tyrannical and arbitrary power as the Immigration Service chose to take. It is significant that neither dissenting opinion has any real "legal" material to support its position. On the other
hand, it is almost unbelievable that if Congress had really thought about
it, it would have submitted war brides to this kind of treatment, and a
judge would certainly not be false to his oath of office if he let a little
humanity temper the rigorjuris by requiring that Congress make absolutely explicit an intention to commit such an act as this.
Here the new Court was willing to follow the slight preponderance in
the weight of the conventional legal materials, without giving any consideration to where the road led. And yet in another alien case, United
States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy,94 the same majority's behavior
was the exact opposite. There the issue was whether a statute which permitted deportation of aliens who committed certain offenses should be
applicable to a naturalized citizen who was not an alien when he committed the offense, but who later became an alien again by denaturalization. If the strict wording of the statute were followed, the petitioner
could not have been deported, since he was not an "alien" when the offense was committed. The majority opinion by justice Burton, expanded
the statute by interpretation to permit the deportation.95 Thus two aliens
93 N.Y. Times, p. i, col. 2 (May i8, i95o). For an earlier stage of the matter, before the
Jackson order but subsequent to the Supreme Court opinion, see ii F. 2d 839 (C.A. 2d, i9so).

94338 U.S. 521 (i95o).

95 The dissent of Justice Frankfurter, joined by Black and Jackson, JJ., reveals the extent
to which it was necessary for the majority to manipulate the statute to reach its result. The
Frankfurter opinion said in part: "the statute, in terms, refers to aliens 'who... may hereafter be convicted,' not persons who are citizens when convicted and later transformed into
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are deported, one by strict and the other by loose construction.
From this one should not for the moment deduce that the Court is
"anti-alien." In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, it put a crimp into thousands of deportations by requiring that once aliens, unlike Mrs. Knauff,
were in the country, they could not be deported without a hearing which
met the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, and were
held "before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing stand96
ards of impartiality."
The Sung and Knauff cases underline the importance for legal purposes
of whether an alien subject to American power has once come into the
country. The Sung case was written by Justice Jackson. His opinion in
Johnson v. Eisentragerillustrates that the alien outside our borders is outside of the protection of our law97
The issue in the Eisentragercase was whether aliens, in this case Germans, convicted by an American military commission abroad for "war
crimes,'" could secure limited review of their convictions in an American
court. Justice Jackson declared that they could not. Since these petitioners
were convicted before an American military commission, it would follow
that the Germans whom Justice Jackson himself convicted at Nuremberg
before an international tribunal were also beyond judicial review. 95
aliens by the process of denaturalization. And this view of the statute is reinforced by the
legislative history as well as by considerations relating to the impact of the Court's decision
upon various other congressional enactments not now before us.
"The Committee reports and congressional debate make plain that Congress was principally
concerned with the status of about 500 persons who had been interned by the President during
the First World War as dangerous alien enemies and about 15o aliens who had been convicted
under various so-called war statutes. Congress could not have been unaware that naturalized
citizens may lose their citizenship; yet nowhere in the legislative history do we find the remotest hint that Congress had also such denaturalized citizens in mind." Ibid., at 534-55. The
dissent also pointed out that citizens might be denaturalized for reasons involving no moral
blame, and yet be subject to deportation under the prevailing interpretation.
6 339 U.S. 33 (i95o). Some related problems suggested by the decision are discussed in
38 Calif. L. Rev. 326 (1950).
97339 U.S. 763 (1950).
98The most serious incidental aspect of the Eisentrager case is whether American civilians
abroad are entitled to any kind of judicial review in the United States if they are imprisoned
by the Army. If no American court has jurisdiction to consider the petition of a foreigner because he is not before the court, it obviously may be argued that they would have no more
jurisdiction in the case of an American. The Solicitor General took the position that Americans
abroad were thus completely subject to military power. The majority carefully avoided accepting that position, though as the dissent of Justice Black, joined by Douglas and Burton, JJ., pointed out, it will be logically difficult to avoid that conclusion when the issue is
squarely raised in the light of this decision.
The special interest of the dissent is in its willingness to have the judiciary assume the full
responsibility of reviewing military convictions abroad. Excerpts from the concluding paragraphs of the dissent are:
"However illegal their sentences might be, they can expect no relief from German courts
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The remaining civil rights problems are so diverse that they may conveniently be divided into four groups: (a) criminal procedure; (b) Congressional procedures; (c) free speech, and (d) segregation.
a) Criminalprocedure.
The most important fact about the five criminal procedure cases, four
of which were decided against the defendant, was that in four of the five,
the certioraris were granted last year,9 9 while the fifth was apparently

taken for the purpose of overruling the Murphy opinion of two years ago
on a matter of searches and seizures. 00
In other words, the former Court had an interest in criminal procedure,
both state and federal, which left an inheritance now disposed of by this
Court. Since January i, i95o,certiorari has been granted in only two cases
involving the constitutional aspects of criminal law.101 It seems safe to
predict that this branch of the law will for a time be swept under the rug
of certiorari denied.
A decision setting aside a conviction of a Negro because of discrimination in the selection of a grand jury was of interest only because Justice
Clark concurred specially to express some doubts about the wisdom of
reversing a conviction on that ground, while justice Jackson dissented
essentially on the ground that grand juries are of no great importance
anyway.-0 ' A right to counsel case had as its main interest the fact that
Justices Clark and Minton joined a majority in applying the rule that
counsel is not constitutionally required where there is no "fundamental
unfaimess. ' ' 1°3 The minority on this issue, which has contended that poor
or any other branch of the German Government we permit to function. Only our own courts
can inquire into the legality of their imprisonment. Perhaps, as some nations believe, there is
merit in leaving the administration of criminal laws to executive and military agencies completely free from judicial scrutiny. Our Constitution has emphatically expressed a contrary
poicy .... ." Ibid., at 797-98.
"Conquest by the United States, unlike conquest by many other nations, does not mean
tyranny.... Our constitutional principles are such that their mandate of equal justice under
law should be applied as well when we occupy lands across the sea as when our flag flew only
over thirteen colonies.... I would hold that our courts can exercise [habeas corpus] whenever
any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land we govern. Courts should
not for any reason abdicate this, the loftiest power with which the Constitution has endowed
them." Ibid., at 798.
99Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (X950); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (i95o); Quicksall v.
Michigan, 339 U.S. 66o (i95o); Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9 (195o)100 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. s6 (ig5o).
101 The two cases are carried forward to the October, I95O Term, as Compagna v. Hiatt,
i9 U. S. L. Week 3001 (July 7, I95O); and Dowd v. Cook, Ibid., at 3002.
- Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
"0S Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 66o (1950). The rule applies to noncapital state court
cases.
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persons are entitled to counsel as a constitutional right, is thus reduced
to two-Justices Black and Douglas.
The more important cases were the two overrulings of decisions of Justice Murphy. In Wade v. Mayo, 0 4 the Court through Justice Murphy had
held that while a state prisoner claiming violation of a constitutional right
at his trial must exhaust his state remedies before applying to the federal
district court for habeas corpus, that exhaustion rule did not require him
to pursue his "state remedies" to the point of petitioning the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari from the state supreme court. This
year Justice Reed, in Darr v. Burford,05 overruled the Wade decision, to
which he had previously dissented.
Since there are hundreds, and perhaps more than a thousand, convicted persons raising constitutional objections each year, apd since the
Supreme Court could not conceivably review the cases of more than a few
of them, the new rule puts another blind alley in the labyrinth of procedures already confronting the convicted. In remarks to the circuit judges
at the beginning of the term, Chief Justice Vinson emphasized the importance of assurance of a fair trial by proper post-conviction procedures. He
said, "I firmly believe, despite the burden, that the right to petition the
Supreme Court should remain and should not be made any more difficult.' 'Io6 It now remains, but it is certainly more difficult. Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Jackson dissented, and Justice Douglas did not
participate.
The search and seizure problem of United States v. Rabinowiteo? involved the circumstances under which a warrantless search may accompany a validly warranted arrest. Up to four years ago, the law on that
subject had been clear and workable: a search without a warrant accompanying a proper arrest could reach only objects in plain sight. The police
were thus not required to blind their eyes to the obvious, but they were
precluded from rummaging and ransacking.oS At the 1946 term, in Harris
v. United States, ° 9 the Court suddenly swung far, and a conviction was

sustained based on an arrest following a five hour ransacking of a house
without a search warrant. The defendant had been validly arrested, but
for something quite different from that with which he was charged after
the search.
at xvi.
U.S. 56 (ig5o).

104 334 U.S. 672 (1948).

xo670 S. Ct.,

105 339

'0 339

U.S. 200 (i95o).

08 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), as modified in Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (i93i), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).

'09
331 U.S. 145 (1947), discussed briefly, 1946 Term article,
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At the 1947 term, the Court swung just as far the other way. In Trupiano v. United States,-0 justice Murphy introduced a modification into
both the Harrisrule and the preceding "plain sight" rule. His opinion
required police to have a warrant if there was reasonable opportunity to
obtain one. But this made the law look foolish; in Trupiano "search"
which consisted of noticing the stills which surrounded a moonshiner,
when he was validly arrested, was held illegal because the police could
have obtained a search warrant.
The only happy solution to the extreme of Harris and the counterextreme of Trupiano would be to overrule both of them and put the law
back in the perfectly satisfactory shape it had before the "improvements"
began. In the Rabinowitz case, the Court, in an opinion by justice Minton,
overruled Trupiano. The case may also indicate an intention to put some
limitation on Harris.In Rabinowitz, a warrant was issued for the arrest
of the defendant for dealing in forged postage stamps. He was arrested
in the small room in which his business was carried on, and the police
without a warrant, searched his desk, safe, and file cabinet and found
forged stamps. In upholding the conviction the Court emphasized, among
other points, that these receptacles, at least, were in plain sight, that the
search was confined to the room actually used for unlawful purposes, and
that the objects found were immediately related to the purpose of the
arrest. These factors differentiate the Harris case. It was of course unnecessary to reaffirm Harrisin toto, and the Court did not do so. Whether
it would do so if the question were presented thus remains a partially
open question.
b) Congressionalprocedures.
Activities in Congress continued at the center of the civil rights stage
during the year 1949-50. Those activities took two primary forms. Most
dramatic was the repetition of fabulous charges by a few irresponsible
but noisy persons. By the end of the year, the process of indiscriminate
and unsupported accusations was beginning to meet strong opposition
from leaders of both parties.""
Those abuses of democratic process were the backdrop for the other
congressional activity, committees of inquiry. The committees, armed
with the subpoena power, searched for evidence which might lend credence
to the unsupported charges which had precipitated them. As a result, a
"o 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
"I Consult, for example, the remarks of Senator Margaret Chase Smith, 96 Cong. Rec.
8ooi (June 1, 195o).
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series of legal problems arising from the committees' activities are beginning to reach the Court.
In the committee hearings, witnesses are in a difficult position. If they
answer questions, they risk the possibility that some renegade may turn
up to be believed on a charge of perjury. If they decline to answer, they
may be held in contempt. An increasing number have chosen to risk the
contempt charge.
In United States v. Bryan,112 the issue was whether excerpts from testimony could be read to a jury to convict a witness of contempt in view of a
statutory provision that "no testimony given by a witness before any committee of either House shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding ... except perjury." Defendant, charged with contempt, rather than
with perjury, contended that the testimony which was the basis of the
alleged contempt could not be read to the jury. The majority, through
Justice Vinson found this an "absurd conclusion" which was not within
"the congressional purpose" although it was within the literal language
of the statute. Justices Black and Frankfurther dissented, Justice Black
contending that this restriction was no more absurd than the limitation
on self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment.
More important was United States v. Fleischman,13 a companion to the
Bryan case. Bryan was the actual custodian of the records of the Joint
Anti-Fascist Committee. His refusal to produce the records was regarded
as contempt. Fleischman was a member of the board of directors of that
organization and had only as much control over those records as one
member of a board of sixteen might have. The Court, again through Chief
Justice Vinson, affirmed a judgment of her contempt despite the fact that
the government did not prove that she could have done anything effective
about the records. The majority held such proof unnecessary, concluding
that in this case the burden of proof was on the defendant, to prove that
she could not have had any influertce on the board, rather than on the government. Justices Black and Frankfurter dissenting vigorously, protested
this transfer of the burden of proof to the defendant on the critical issue
of the case. The dissent also hit hard at the indefiniteness of an order
which somehow required the defendant to "try" to compel others to produce papers, without any indication of just what she was expected to do.
Related, insofar as they arose from the loyalty program, were two cases
1 4
involving juries in the District of Columbia. In Dennis v. United States, '
defendant was charged with contempt of the House Un-American Coin'- 339 U.S. 323 (1950).

113339

U.S. 349 (1950).

114

339 U.S. z62 (1950).
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mittee. Seven of his jurors were government employees. The Court held
this not prejudicial in the circumstances. The majority opinion by Justice
Minton, with a concurrence by Justice Reed, refused to hold that the
loyalty program did not disqualify government jurors. Indeed, a defendant was entitled to show that jurors might be disqualified for this reason.1 5 However, at the time of the Dennis conviction, the Court thought
the loyalty program was sufficiently new so that it could not, at that time,
have created such a Gestapo atmosphere as to invalidate the conviction.
Justice Black, dissenting, said: "Government employees have good
reason to fear that an honest vote to acquit a Communist or anyone else
accused of 'subversive' beliefs, however flimsy the prosecutor's evidence,
might be considered a 'disloyal' act which could easily cost them their
job. That vote alone would in all probability evoke clamorous demands
that he be publicly investigated or discharged outright; at the very least
'
it would result in whisperings, suspicions, and a blemished reputation."""
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, said: "Only naivet6 could be unmindful
of the force of the considerations set forth by Mr. justice Black, and
known of all men. There is a pervasiveness of atmosphere in Washington
whereby forces are released in relation to jurors who may be deemed supporters of an accused under a cloud of disloyalty....", 7
c) Free Speech.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds"8 is the most important
decision on free speech in more than ten years. It begins a new cycle in
the rising and falling history of the "clear and present danger" test.
The clear and present danger test arises from the fact that while the
First Amendment in terms prohibits any interference with freedom of
speech, no judge has yet been found on the Supreme Court who is willing
to apply the rule as an absolute. The problem of how free speech should
be qualified has been particularly perplexing for the last thirty years.
During World War I, Holmes enunciated his classic test, that speech
might not be prohibited unless there was a clear and present danger of a
's In Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (ig5o), the Court, per curiam, reversed a decision in a case similar to that of Dennis in which the defendant had not been allowed "to
interrogate prospective government employee jurors upon voir dire examination with specific
reference to the possible influence of the 'Loyalty Order'. . . ." At 259. For an excellent and

comprehensive discussion of the problem, consult Heller, Justice, Jury Trials, and Government
Service, 35 Corn. L. Q. 814 (1950). Mr. Heller observes, "If the loyalty program places government employees in a category by themselves, the law can hardly close its eyes to such distinction." Ibid., at 823.
"6 339 U.S. 162, i8o (1950).
17Ibid., at i82.
218 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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substantive evil which Congress had the right to prohibit 1 9 Holmes's
analysis there applied to "political speech"-to speech directed to affairs
of state, and he had in mind punishment of the traditional fine or imprisonment variety.
In the mid-192o's, such cases as Gitlow v. New York"2 and Whitney v.
California2 abandoned the clear and present danger test, substituting
for it the so-called "bad tendency" test under which there was no longer a
necessity of showing a real likelihood of serious consequences of speech,
but rather merely a possibility of such consequences.
The Holmes-Brandeis point of view received its ultimate statement in
their concurrence in the Whitney case. Vital passages from their opinion
in that case are these: "To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent .... [E]ven advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on."
But who was to make the factual judgment implied by this test? Justices Brandeis and Holmes continued, "In order to support a finding of
clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious
violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct
furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.
..It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging
free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it."'
In the American CommunicationsAss'n case the issue was the validity
of a provision in the Taft-Hartley Act excluding from the protections of
that Act any union which has not appropriately shown both that its
officers are not Communists and second, that its officers do "not believe in" or support any "organization that believes in or teaches" the
overthrow of the government. The statute thus requires an oath both as
to personal conduct and as to individual beliefs, and also requires the
officer to take oath as to the "belief" of an organization. The principal
X.9Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
12 268
"

U.S.

652 (1925).

274 U.S. 357 (1927). The cases are well described in Chafee, op. cit. supra note 85, at

319-S.
z"The quotations are from the concurring opinion, 274 U.S. 357, 376-79

(1927).
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opinion by Chief Justice Vinson, holding the Act valid, took the following positions:
(i) Substantial evidence was presented to Congress, on the persuasiveness of which the Court did not pass, showing that Communists engage in
political strikes.
(2) The restriction of the Act is more than a disqualification of individuals to hold office: "We are, therefore, neither free to treat Section 9
(h) as if it merely withdraws a privilege gratuitously granted by the Government, nor able to consider it a licensing statute prohibiting those persons who do not sign the affidavit from holding union office.... The difficult question that emerges is whether, consistently with the First Amendment, Congress, by statute, may exert these pressures upon labor unions
to deny positions of leadership to certain persons who are identified by
particular beliefs and political affiliations."
(3) Congress under the commerce power may attempt to prevent
political strikes. Restrictions of this kind are similar to restrictions on
bank directors in the underwriting business: "Political affiliations of the
kind here involved, no less than business affiliations, provide rational
ground for the legislative judgment...."
(4) The clear and present danger test is not a mathematical formula.
Justice Brandeis in the Whitney case was considering restrictions on dissemination of doctrine. This case is different-here Congress is protecting
commerce from interruption. The "danger" to be protected against need
not be anything so spectacular as danger to the nation. "[Llegitimate attempts to protect the public... from present excesses of direct, active
conduct, are not presumptively bad because they interfere with and, in
someof its manifestations, restrain the exercise of First Amendment rights."
(5) The Court must weigh the circumstances and appraise the substantiality of the reasons for such restrictions; but the Court must give
due deference to Congressional judgment. Congress has not attempted
to restrain the activities of the Communist Party as a political organization. The provision touches "only a relative handful of persons," and
even that handful suffers only "possible loss of positions."
(6) The "belief'" provision is so broad that it must be saved by narrow
construction. The "belief" is therefore interpreted to mean a "belief in
the objective of overthrow by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
methods of the Government of the United States as it now exists under the
Constitution and laws thereof. 1' 23
123The

quotations are from the opinion of the Court, 339 U.S 382, 390-408 (i95o).
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Other contentions may be put aside. Justice Jackson concurred on all
points except the belief provision, which he thought unconstitutional.
His concurrence was even more extreme than the majority opinion on its
points of agreement. He declared-in dramatic derogation of positions
previously held by him-that as a judge he had no power to review this
legislation except to determine whether there was crational basis" for
it.24 Justice Black dissented as to all aspects of the opinion.
The majority opinion is summarized in some detail so that it may speak
for itself. It makes prodigious innovations in the law of free speech. If
the Court had merely upheld the statute, its impact might not have been
so great; indeed, conceivably Holmes and Brandeis by applying their test
might have come to the same result. But the opinion goes infinitely beyond the simple needs of the occasion, almost suggesting that we are to
go back again to the Gitlow rule. In my own view, the opinion is a misfortune in these respects:
(i) "Conventional" restrictions of freedom of speech ordinarily consist of putting the offender in jail. Our own generation is finding more
sophisticated ways of achieving the same result by putting economic instead of criminal sanctions on persons whose speech is offensive. These
sanctions ought to be recognized as mere variants of criminal sanctions,
and ought to be subject to the same tests. In the foreparts of this opinion,
the Court appears to concede part of this vital ground, admitting that
the exclusion from union office is more than the "mere loss" of a position.
But later it appears to abandon the recognition that this is a penalty, and
somehow minimizes it. This will encourage the belief that Congress can
do indirectly what it may not be able to do directly by way of suppression
of individual rights.
(2) In the course of restating a clear and present danger test, the Court
certainly does not improve upon it. Even friends of the test must concede
that it was somewhat elusive ;I2- but now it defies comprehension.
124Justice Jackson had previously been an exponent of the view that "The right of a State
to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis'
for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." West Va. State Bd. of
Education v. Barnette, 3 9 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
Another aspect of the case was the allegation that the oath provision was a bill of attainder.
For an interesting pre-decision discussion, consult Wormuth, On Bills of Attainder, 3 West.
Pol. Q. 52 (1950).
12S A most illuminating analysis of the concept is Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the
Clear-and-Present-Danger Test, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1167 (i95o).
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(3)The ultimate serious questions in these cases are, first, who is to
decide whether there is a clear and present danger, and second, what
standard is to be applied? In respect to the first of these questions, the
majority opinion is closer to Holmes and Brandeis than the Jackson
opinion, because the Jackson opinion abdicates this function altogether.
But the majority opinion saves very little because of its answer to the
second question. Its standards are so low that almost any act of Congress
would appear to meet them. If the Court does not see any close relation in
a restraint on banking practices and a restraint on free speech, it leaves
very little of the First Amendment. Moreover, it sets forth none of the
actual facts which appear to lead it to the conclusion that there is a clear
and present danger.
(4)The opinion leaves the impression that free speech is more subject
to restriction when Congress is exercising the commerce power than
would be the case if it were exercising some other power. It is novel for
Congress to attack free speech with this weapon, but it is not true that
any important difference should result.
(5)This is the first case in American history in which belief as such,
completely unrelated to individual action of any kind, has been made the
basis of limitations on the rights of a citizen.
The Black dissent comes close to declaring that speech, as such, should
be beyond all legislative control until individuals commit illegal overt
acts: "[T]he basic constitutional precept [is] that penalties should be imposed only for a person's own conduct, not for his beliefs or for the conduct of others with whom he may associate. Guilt should not be imputed
solely from association or affiliation with political parties or any other
organization, however much we abhor the ideas which they advocate....
Like anyone else, individual Communists who commit overt acts in violation of valid laws can and should be punished. But the postulate of the
First Amendment is that our free institutions can be maintained without
proscribing or penalizing political belief, speech, press, assembly, or party
affiliation.

' ' 26
1

d) Segregation.
This year the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, and its numerous friends, carried to the Court what it intended to
be its ultimate challenge to legally imposed segregation. Southern representatives girded for a last ditch fight. When the smoke had cleared, the
126339 U.S. 382, 452 (195o).
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NAACP had made less progress than it had hoped, but at least as much as
it could have expected.
The familiar story need not be repeated for any one likely to see these
words. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was inserted by victorious abolitionists to secure "equal rights" for Negroes.
The pattern of segregation in America was then just emerging, and there
is legitimate room for confusion over just what the phrase was intended
to accomplish in respect to it. One answer to the Amendment was the
widespread institutionalization of segregation. As Reconstruction fervor
receded, the lords of creation reached a polite compromise under which
Negroes were to be kept "separate but equal"; and that compromise received at least qualified sanction from the Supreme Court in 1896 in
7

Plessy v. Ferguson."

There were three cases this year. In the case of Sweatt v. Painter 8 the
petitioner had been excluded from the regular University of Texas law
school and referred to a special, colored law school set up by order of the
lower court in this case. He declined that alternative and sued for admis9
sion to the University of Texas. In McLaurinv. Oklahoma State Regents"
the petitioner had been admitted to the University of Oklahoma graduate
school, but was segregated in various ways by special seating restrictions,
special dining restrictions, and special library restrictions. In Henderson
v. United States"3 the petitioner had been excluded from a dining car because the few curtained-off "colored tables" were taken, though there
were other empty "white tables" in the car.
In each case, the NAACP attempted to precipitate the issue of the
validity of segregation as such. Supported both on brief and orally by the
Attorney General and the Solicitor General, they asked that Plessy v.
Ferguson be overruled. Briefs were compendious,13' and oral arguments
extensive and well attended by an interested public. The Attorney General, who tradition dictates may speak unquestioned, is said to have presented a powerful and effective statement, gravely warning the Court
that "Unless segregation is ended, a serious blow will be struck at our
3
democracy before the world."''
127 163 U.S. 537. The historical material bearing on the subject is collected in Frank and
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 Col. L. Rev. 131
(1950).
128 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
"19 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
130 339 U.S. 86 (ig5o).
-s' That of the Committee of Law Teachers against Segregation in Legal Education was
reprinted sub nom. Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause, 34 Minn. L .Rev. 289 (1950).
'32

i8 U. S. L. Week 3277 (Apr. 1', 1950).
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The Court did not reconsider the Plessy decision as the Negroes and the
government asked, nor reaffirm it as the defendants requested. Rather
it found sound reasons for deciding the cases on other grounds.
In the Sweatt case, the Court held the colored school "unequal" to the
white school and therefore declared that Sweatt need not attend it. The
important point was the breadth of the reasoning. The Court noticed,
but did not stop with, the mechanical inequalities of difference in faculty
size, course offerings, or libraries. Those are factors which, conceivably,
enough money could cure. But the Court went on to those larger factors
which, by their very nature, undercut all segregation at the graduate
level. It noted "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school," the reputation of the
faculty, quality of administration, influence of alumni, standing in the
community, traditions, and prestige.
"The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes
from its student body members of the racial groups which number 85 per
cent of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a
substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that
which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law
School.' ' 33 This criterion should doom any segregated law school, and all
the criteria taken together should knock out any segregated graduate
school.
So construed, Sweatt requires that Negroes be admitted to general state
graduate schools. McLaurin forbids segregation of students after their
admission. It holds that a school may not "set apart" its students, because the restrictions would impair effective study and also handicap the
students who wish "to engage in discussions and exchange views with
' s4
other students."'
The Henderson case avoided the constitutional issue by holding that a
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act forbade this type of discrimination. That provision, however, is so close in substance to the constitutional
provision that the difference should not be significant. 35 The case is im3 339 U.S. 629, 634 (195-)34Ibid., at 641.
,sS
The statute forbids subjection of any person ",to any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever," and thus in effect makes the same mandate as
the equal protection clause when it is interpreted to forbid "unreasonable classifications."
24 Stat. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 3(W (1929).
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portant both because at least one kind of dining car segregation is declared
"unreasonable," and because the unreasonableness lies solely in the fact
of the separation of the races. The food, the prices, and the service were
otherwise the same.
The largest intellectual importance of these cases is that while they
purport not to touch Plessy v. Ferguson, they do extensively undermine
it. Plessy rested on a practical judgment that the judiciary was incapable
of doing anything effective about race relations; hence the Court bowed
to the inevitable. The Plessy majority was perfectly explicit about this.1 6

The fact that the Court is now moving in this field shows that it does not
share the complete pessimism of the Plessy majority.
Plessy necessarily surrounded its practical judgment with some legalisms. One of these was that segregation is not a white judgment of colored
inferiority, and therefore a discriminatory practice; and that if Negroes
think otherwise it is because they are unduly self-conscious. 37 The other
was that segregation is not discriminatory because, while it is true that
Negroes are kept out of white units, whites are kept out of Negro units,
thus creating an equality of restriction.131 The recent decisions attacked
both those premises. Sweatt flatly repudiated the second, saying, "It may
be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is no different from
excluding white students from the new law school. This contention over39
looks realities."'
The practical effects of the decisions are already beginning to appear.
Texas has admitted Sweatt to its law school, and there will be at least
two more Negroes in that University. Oklahoma announced that there
would be 82-unsegregated-graduate students in its various divisions
in the summer of 1950.

On the other hand, Governor Talmadge of Georgia spouts fire at the
thought of mixed education, and the Alabama legislature passed a most
critical resolution and declared that it would not have mixed education
in its lower schools.14

°

X36The discussion at 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 takes the ground that law is "powerless" before
"usages, customs and traditions" of race.

X37The Court said that segregration did not stamp "the colored race'with a badge of inferiority"; if it did so, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Ibid., at 551.
139Justice Harlan, dissenting, discussed this point in some detail. Ibid., at 557.
X39
339 U.S. 629, 634 (i95o).
140 The data in the two foregoing paragraphs is taken from miscellaneous news clippings.
It is widely believed that reaction against the decisions in North Carolina caused the defeat
of liberal Senator Frank Graham in a runoff primary immediately following the opinions.
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The Alabama furor suggests the real problem of these cases. There is
good reason to believe that many Southerners do not feel nearly as
strongly about maintaining segregated education at the graduate level as
they do about maintaining it in the grades. Assuming that such education
must be even dose to equal in fact, it is too expensive to maintain two
4
systems.' '
What the South wants to avoid is (a) mixed primary and secondary
education, and (b) the expenditure of the estimated billion dollars it
would cost to put their primary and secondary systems into a state of
even superficial equality. This year's decisions, by avoiding the ultimate
question of Plessy v. Ferguson, do not decide whether the South must do
one or the other. But by moving toward a test of real equality, the Court
gives an omen that it means business up and down the line.
SUMMARY OF CIVIL RIGHTS POSITIONS

A summary of the positions of the Justices in the nonunanimous civil
rights cases follows. As always, such data must be read with the greatest
of care, for they may be misleading. This year very special warning must
be given that the table includes only the cases in which the Court divided.
The segregation cases therefore, are not in this table.
In comparing this table with the data for previous years, it should be
remembered, as will be shown in some detail, that the departure of two
Justices broke the group of four which previously had been able to grant
certiorari in many civil rights cases. Denials of certiorari undoubtedly
kept some potential cases out of this table which might otherwise have
shown more greatly the differences of view between Justices Black and
Douglas and some of their brethren.
When all the necessary qualifications are made, this table nonetheless
has substantial residual value. If a given Justice's decisions put him preponderantly in one column or the other, then the figures contain a clue or
hint as to his basic attitudes about civil rights.
There were fifteen divided civil rights cases at the 1949 term.r 4 Dis141 An exchange in the oral argument between Justice Minton and Oklahoma's Assistant
Attorney General Hansen is suggestive: justice Minton: "When segregation has broken down
as it has in Oklahoma, there isn't much point to segregation, is there?" Mr. Hansen: "Possibly
[not] on the graduate's level." 18 U. S. L. Week 3280 (April ii, i95o).
142 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (ig5o); Building Service Union
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (i95o); Dennis v. United
States, 339 U.S. z62 (195o); Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (i95o);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 66o (195o);
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (i95o); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (195o);
United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 68o (i95o); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950);
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qualifications or absences result in some Justices having less than this

number.
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
IN DENIAL OF CIAIME
IN SUPPORT O CLArIED
RIGHT

RIGHT

Per Cent

Per Cent
of

1946-

1949

Vinson
Black

Reed
Frankfurter
Douglas
Jackson
Burton
Clark
Minton

2

14
2

II
2

48

8
39

8
23
47
14
10

6
3
I ........
3 ......

Total Total
10

I3%

53
i0
34
49
20

75

13
i

3

13
47
83
29
16
13

of

1946-

1949

13
1
13
4

o
9
12

7
122

48
49
17

49
34
1o
41
47
......
.......

Total Total
62
87%

'8

25

62
38
10
50
59
7
12

87
53
17
71
84
87
8o

IV. LAWYERS' LAW
Except for the developments relating to certiorari, there was substantially nothing of interest this year in conflicts, federal jurisdiction, procedure, or legislation. The only exceptions arose in connection with the
form of notice required by due process. In an outstanding discussion of
the subject, justice Jackson for the Court declared invalid a New York
attempt to settle the accounts of a common trust fund after notice by
publication. Thrusting aside the technicalities of "in rem" and "in personam," he declared that the interests to be balanced in requiring a type
of notice are those of the state in settling fiduciary accounts, and those
of the individual to actual notice. Where notice is to be required, "the
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Hence where beneficiaries can by due diligence be located, though outside the state, they
must have actual notice. As to all others, published notice will have to
do.143

United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (i95o); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (I95o); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (i95o).
Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (295o), is essentially a duplicate of the American Communications Ass'n case. It is included in this table only to note the views of Douglas and Minton,
JJ., who did not participate in the American Communications Ass'n decision.
Unanimous civil rights cases, in addition to the three segregation decisions cited notes 12830 supra, were Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232
(1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (I95O); Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258
(i95o); Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
'43 Mullane

v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (ig5o).

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1949-50

Equally practical was the majority in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia r 44 There the issue was whether Virginia could effectively serve a
complaint by mail on an insurance company which was not in any technical way doing business in Virginia-except that it was selling insurance
to Virginia residents by mail, as a result of general advertisements. justice Black for the majority held that this was "doing business" quite
sufficiently to permit mailed service to be binding under the Constitution.
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

As Justice Frankfurter puts it, "All that a denial of a petition for a writ
of certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought
it should be granted."' 45 In other words, the grant or the denial of the writ
is wholly discretionary. But in the exercise of discretion to decline to hear,
as in the exercise of other judicial discretion, patterns may appear. Some
began to emerge in the new policies of the new Court.
These feaiures stand out in the practices developing this year:
i. The Court is apparently desirous of cutting its docket to a very low
volume. That level dropped so low this year that three Justices as prolific as Hughes or Brandeis or Stone could have written all the majority
opinions of 1949-50 with no perceptible strain.
The Court is compressing its docket (a) by denials of certiorari; (b) by
disposing of ten per cent of the few cases heard by per curiam opinions;
(c) by very summary treatment of some matters. The Court's treatment
of Dye v. Johnson 46 is illustrative. That case raised very substantial and
difficult questions of whether, in the circumstances, the Georgia chain
gang was a "cruel and unusual punishment," and if so, whether a federal
court might block an extradition back to Georgia through the writ of
habeas corpus. The issues are sufficiently difficult to have given a superb
court, the third circuit, a difficult time. Sitting en banc, that Court,
through its distinguished senior Judge Biggs, decided the matter in a most
interesting and earnest way. The Supreme Court summarily reversed
without hearing argument, giving no discussion, and citing only one case,
44 339 U.S. 643 (ig5o). Barr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (195o), involving the jurisdictional
question of the nature of the exhaustion of state remedies in habeas corpus cases, and Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (ig5o), involving jurisdiction of American courts in habeas corpus
suits by foreign prisoners, were discussed above in the civil rights section. Other cases involving
jurisdictional points were Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (venue under
FELA); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950) (finality of order under
Rule 54(b) prior to its recent amendment).
'4SState v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 99 (1950).
146338 U.S. 864 (1949), reversing, per curiam, 175 F. 2d 250 (C.A. 3d,- 1949).
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and that one not dearly in point. 47 Such abrupt disposition of a serious
matter leaves the third circuit and the bar in real confusion.
2. The Court is using its discretionary power to eliminate from its
docket civil liberties problems which would have disturbed its predecessor
Court. As was noted above, all but one of the criminal procedure cases
heard this year were left over from the year before; and only two certioraris were granted in that field since January ist.
The new method of administering the certiorari jurisdiction amounts
to a new conception of the purposes of the Judiciary Act of 1925. That
act was intended to allow the Justices adequate time for serious issues,
but it had not previously been supposed that they would need so much
time as to result in a reduction of the docket to an average of only about
48
ten cases per year per Justice1
V.

THE INSTITUTION AND ITS JUSTICES
THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTION

As has been noted, the number of cases decided by opinion, including
per curiams but excluding companion cases, was 94. At the preceding
term the number was 122, and the term before that it was ii9. Before the
war, the docket usually ran to 20o and more cases a year. This reduction
in the size of the docket this year was due primarily to the extraordinary
rigor, discussed in the immediately preceding section, with which the writ
of certiorari was administered.
It was at the same time a season of extraordinary difficulty for the Court
due to new and ailing personnel. Mr. King, in his biography of Chief Justice Fuller, suggests that "perhaps the worst year in the history of the
Court was the term commencing in October, i909, and ending in May,
igio, just prior to Fuller's sudden death in July of that year. Justice

Moody was entirely incapacitated, Justice Peckham died in October, and
Justice Brewer the following March."'

49

The October, 1949 term was

147 338 U.S. 864 (1949). The order of the Court states, "The petition for writ of certiorari is
granted and the judgment is reversed. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114." (1944). A reading of the
Hawk case will give very little illumination. Did the Court mean (a) all persons in Johnson's
position must bring their petitions in the court of the state in which they are a fugitive; or (b)
in the court of the state of their original incarceration; or (c) did it mean merely that Johnson,
as an individual, having started his own case in a Pennsylvania state court, would not thereafter be allowed to raise the issue in a federal court though other persons might do so if they
had not made that beginning? For discussion of the problem, see Prisoners' Remedies for
Mistreatment, 59 Yale L.J. 8oi (1950). The Second Circuit, inferentially admitting that it was
puzzled, hagiven interpretation (a) to the order. U.S. ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 181 F. 2d
588 (C.A. 2d, i95o).
X49An appendix, p. 52 infra, lists some of the cases denied certiorari this past session.
149King,

Melville Weston Fuller 309 (ig5o).
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almost as greatly handicapped, with two new Justices coming on the bench
at the beginning of the year, Justice Douglas gone for almost the entire
year, and Justice Reed, though able to participate in all the cases, in variable health.
One of the most obvious differences in the execution of the work of the
Court was the increase of brevity.,5I This clearly was due in part to the
decline in the volume of dissents. The departure of Justices Murphy and
Rutledge removed two very free dissenters, thus creating a greater
unanimity.
The distribution of majority opinions among the Justices is shown in
Table 2.51
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJORITY OPINIONS

Vinson ...............
Black ................

io
12

Reed .................

5

Frankfurter ...........
Douglas ..............

8
4

Jackson ..............
Burton ...............

Clark ................

Minton ..............
Per curiam............

13
9
12
12

9

The loss of two of his closest intellectual associates and the absence of
Justice Douglas reduced the influence of the views of Justice Black to the
lowest point they have had for many years. For all practical purposes, the
ruling group in the Supreme Court today is Chief Justice Vinson, Justice
Burton, Justice Clark, Justice Minton, and any one other Justice-usually Justice Reed.
These conclusions are illustrated by the tables that follow. The degree
of prevalence of the views of particular justices can best be measured by
concentrating on the most important of the decisions, and for this purpose I have arbitrarily shown two groups of cases which seem to me to
have the most important consequences to society. The first group consists
of the five cases which seem the most significant of the year.152 The second
group of 21 cases are definitely less important, but are not routine.'- 3

ISO
Using a measure of pages alone, the October, 1948, term occupies 1,483 pages in the
Supreme Court Reporter, and the October, 1949, term occupies 1,032. Thus, the Court handled
about 20 per cent less cases in about 30 per cent less pages.
1S!This is a strict count, excluding simple companion cases, cases not argued, and cases
disposed of with an order not amounting to even a simple per curiam opinion.
Is2 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (195o); Int. Brotherhood of
Teamsters v, Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (rg5o); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(i95o); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (i95o); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(195o).
I"'Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (I95o); Building
Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 523 (ig5o); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339
U.S. 542 (i95o); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. State Airlines Inc., 338 U.S. 572 (r95o); Darr v. Bur-
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The data in Tables 3 and 4 are taken from these two groups. Disqualifications give some Justices less than the total of 26.
Table 5 shows the detailed breakdown of the agreements among Justices in major and important cases.
TABLE 3
VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES
MAJORITY VOTES

DISSENTING VOTES

JUSTICE

Major Important Total
Vinson
Black
Reed
Frankfurter
Douglas
Jackson
Burton

Clark
Minton

5
2
4
4
2
4
5
4
3

Major Important Total

20
15
16
12
3

25

0
3

13

17

i8
i8

23
22

0
0

17

20

1I

17

20
16
5

I
I

1
1

0
6
5
9
3
6
2

0
9
6
10

4
7
2

0

0

3

4

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE IN MAJORITY MAJOR
AND IMPORTANT CASES
Vinson
Black
Reed

100

65
77

Frankfurter

6o

Douglas
Jackson

55
78

Burton

92

Clark
Minton

1oo
83

THE WORK OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

Chief Justice Vinson, after four years on the bench, is now far more influential due to the new Truman appointees. There is no reason to suppose
either that he dominates them or that they dominate him; rather, the
group is like-minded. As has been shown throughout this article, and parford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S.

x62 (1950); FPC v. East Ohio Gas
Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen, 338
U.S. 232 (1948); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (ig5o); Hughes v. Superior Court,
339 U.S. 460 (i95o); Int. Union, UAWA, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 3o6 (1950); Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950);
Secretary of Agric. v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604 (195o); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (195o); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); Travellers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (195o); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S.
121 (195o); United States v. Fleischmann, 339 U.S. 349 (195o); United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (i95o); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
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ticularly by the data in the immediately preceding section, his and their
views now prevail in substantially every important instance.
One important difference between the Chief Justice's work this year
and other years was in his selection of the opinions for himself. In some
years past, he has chosen some very small matters. This year, however,
he wrote the opinions of the Court in the two major segregation cases and
34
in the Taft-Hartley free speech case.
From the standpoint of quality, the opinions of the Chief Justice continue without marked distinction. The principal criticism made in these
articles in years past has been that the Chief justice on occasion either
did not squarely face intellectual obstacles or skirted them in exceedingly
ingenuous and devious fashion by highly verbal distinctions. That critiTABLE 5
AGREEMENTS AmONG JUSTICES IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES

Vinson

16

Vinson
Black
Reed
Frankfurter

Jackson
Burton
Clark
Minton

Black

16

Reed
19

Jackson

Burton

15

17

23

15
18
14
16

Clark Minton
18
19
13
15

16

12

13

12

14

17

18
15

.

14
5

13
14

15
14

..
21

21

23

15
14
13
15..

18

13

15

12

12

17

--

I9

16

22

13

14

i8

15

g
is
17

15

Frankfurter

22

cism cannot be fairly repeated this year except for the Taft-Hartley free
speech case, in which, to this reader, the opinion fails squarely to meet
and overcome the obstacles between the Chief Justice and his result.
From a technical standpoint, one of the best of the Chief Justice's opinions of the year was United States v. Aetna Casualty Co.,5ss a problem of
subrogation under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In his new position of "leader with allies," the Chief Justice remains a
dominantly conservative influence in economic and civil rights matters.
The one important exception is in race relations cases, in which he has
Xs4American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (ig5o); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (i95o); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (i95o).
ss 338 U.S. 366 (1949). The case is discussed briefly in James and Thornton, The Impact of

Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 429, 438-39 (1950).

Prof. Ehren-

zweig, Assurance Oblige, Ibid., at 444, 451, citing the case says, "The Supreme Court of the
United States recently permitted accident insurers to recover as subrogees from the Federal
Government under a federal statute which in terms protects only the injured himself. It is
regrettable that the court in so holding failed to consider the underlying economic issue
whether risk distribution through taxation, necessitated by admitting subrogation, is preferable
to risk distribution through the increase of first party insurance premiums caused by the denial
of subrogation."
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written memorable, though in some instances cautious, opinions leading
the way toward reform.16
For justice Black, the 1949 term brought the wheel of judicial experience to full circle. In 1937, he came to the bench as a frequent lone dissenter. The years brought intellectual companions, and during the forties,
his was a voice influential in the councils of the Court. In the year past,
having outlasted his allies, he was again in the position of frequent dissent. One difference was important: the intervening years have given
Black a reputation as an outstanding jurist which means that the dissents
have a following and weight.
For Black personally, the release from majority responsibilities permitted the first relaxation since his appointment. For years he had accepted no more than one speaking engagement during a term, if that; this
year he made several addresses. For years his work routine was early
morning till late night during the term of Court; this year he found time
for a few days in the West to visit Justice Douglas.
Relaxation did not mean abandonment of duties. As always, he was
among the first in volume of majority opinions written. Three of the outstanding from the standpoint of lawyer-like workmanship were United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,17 involving the cost in relation to
ceiling prices of articles cbndemned in wartime; FPC v. East Ohio Gas
Company,5 applying the Natural Gas Act to certain intermediate transportation of gas; and Solesbee v. Balkom,5 9 concerning the type of hearing
which must be accorded allegedly insane persons before they may be
electrocuted for capital offenses.
His dissents were forceful, if hopeless. In the Taft-Hartley free speech
case, he scored guilt by association and reaffirmed his conviction that
Americans should be punished as a result of political beliefs only for overt
6 0 His dissenting opinion protesting the
acts actually committed by them.1
trial of a Communist before a jury largely composed of government employees, themselves all subject to the sanctions of the loyalty program,
was read, according to a letter from a courtroom observer, "in a voice
'' 6
of scorn and steel. x1
,6 The Chief Justice adds the segregation cases this year to a list which already included
the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 334 U.S. i, 24 (1948), and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948), involving the California land laws directed against Japanese.
IS7339 U.S. 121 (195o).
159 338 U.S. 464 (195o).
'S9 339 U.S. 9 (195o).
x6o American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (i95o). For daring of concept,
this dissent and the dissent in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (i95o), are remarkable.
6
1 1Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (195o).
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For Reed, the year was one of peculiar disappointment. His health
waned at the very moment when his intellectual powers could have had
their largest consequence. Reed is closer in his views to the Truman appointees than the remainder of the residual members of the Roosevelt
Court. Black's fall is paralleled by Reed's rise in influence. For years,
Reed has been the civil liberties right wing of the Court. Others have now
been added to that wing. Reed's experience and ability, both most extensive, could make him the intellectual leader of the Truman group. He
could well become the Sutherland to Vinson's Taft-the writer of the
most important and most serious opinions for the new Court. By the end
of the term the Justice's health was markedly improved, and he may well
occupy that role in 1950-51.
But the Justice's stamina was not up to that opportunity this year. He
wrote only five majority opinions, less than any one except Justice Douglas. One excellent example of treatment of a neat but small matter was
United States v. Burnison, holding valid a California statute which precludes testamentary gifts to the United States. The most important Reed
6
opinion, and one which illustrates his new influence, was Darrv. Burford,13
64
overruling Wade v. Mayo,1 and holding that prisoners raising constitutional objections to their trials must not only exhaust state remedies but
must, as a part of that exhaustion, petition for certiorari. He brushed
aside the Wade case, in which he had dissented, with the passage, "We
do not stop to reexamine the meaning of Wade's specific language. Whatever deviation Wade may imply from the established rule will be corrected by this decision." Unfortunately, Reed's opinions are not always as
crisp and to the point as that in the Burnison case; the Darrcase becomes
repetitious.
Justice Frankfurter, as usual, wrote very few majority opinions, but he
was otherwise active. His most important majority opinion was Int.
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hankex6s drastically limiting the constitutional protections of picketing. This opinion is an excellent example of
skillful use of legal materials. In other opinions, he continued his campaign to inform the bar and his brethren of the true meaning of the writ of
certiorari, 66 and held to his one-man program to abandon the so-called
62339 U.S. 87 (195o).
!63

339 U.S. 2oo (i950).

114334 U.S. 672 (1948).
16S339 U.S. 470 (1950).

x66See, e.g., State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (195o).
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"rule of four" by refusing himself to participate in some matters which
four of his brethren had decided to hear.167
The most colorful development concerning Frankfurter this year was
that, after years of appearing at most a moderate on issues of civil rights,
he has again been made into a "liberal" by the majority's turn to the
right. Since the Black-Douglas wing of the Court no longer has the votes
to grant certiorari in the cases which once divided them and Frankfurter,
some of the differences among these Justices seemed to disappear. Frankfurter brought to his new alliance the pungency with which he had supported his old one, as when he referred to an immigration act in dissent:
"I deem it my duty not to squeeze the Act of May io, 1920, so as to yield
'6 8
every possible hardship of which it is susceptible.'
However, in terms of larger issues, Frankfurter was not nearly so completely isolated as Black. In the five major cases of the year, he was in
dissent only on that one involving searches and seizures. 6 9 His limited
concept of the role of the Court in reviewing alleged invasions of freedom
of speech prevailed in the Taft-Hartley case, 70 and his majority opinion in
the picketing case carries his whole philosophy of due process of law very
firmly into an area where it had never been before.' 7'
Due to a serious riding mishap, Justice Douglas was unable to rejoin
the Court until Spring. During his recuperation he published a best seller
on his mountain climbing experiences and in the Spring he was chosen
most unwillingly "father of the year." By the Summer of 195o he was sufficiently recovered to be able to undertake a new mountain climbing excursion in Iran.
The Justice returned to the bench in time to write four opinions, the
most important of which was the Texas tidelands case, which well exemplifies his sure, quick, touch.' 72 He also had the opportunity in a per
167Consult 1948 Term article, 37-38. Justice Frankfurter applied this view by refusing to
participate in Carter v. Atlantic & St. Andrews Bay Co., 338 U.S. 430 (I9M); Affolder v. N.Y.
C. & St. L.R. Co., 339 U.S. 96 (i95o); O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384(1949).
While Justice Frankfurter refused to participate in these cases which his brethren wished to
hear, he continued to display his independence by filing an extended opinion replete with
English authorities in State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950), which the other

members of the Court chose not to hear.
x68United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
169 Cases

cited note 152 supra.
170 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (I95o).
17T
Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke 339 U.S. 470 (i95o). A Collection of the Justice's opinions was published this year, Konefsky, The Constitutional World of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter. Reviews with interesting insights into the Justice, pro and con, are Curtis and
Rodell, 59 Yale L. J. ioo9, io3 (i95o); Pritchett, 36 Va. L. Rev. 281 (95o).
172United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (igo). The serious new point raised by the Texas
petition for rehearing, note 76 supra, does not detract from this conclusion. It had been
overlooked in the original Texas brief.
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curiam to note his view that the Taft-Hartley oath provision was unconstitutional.173

Justice Jackson had a fruitful year, writing thirteen majority opinions,
and frequently exhibiting that freshness of view and superb writing style
which are his trademarks. Two excellent examples of this fluency are his
concurrence in the Taft-Hartley oath case, which was republished as an
article in the New York Times magazine section and which reads as
though it were designed for that purpose;174 and his majority opinion in
United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.,17s on eminent domain problems in
connection with the Central Valley Project in California. This latter
opinion may well be the best description, from a literary standpoint,
which has ever been made of the Central Valley Project. The descriptive
passages are at the expense of brevity, but the cost is small for the quality.
Occasionally the Jackson opinions have an elusive touch. The remand
order in Roth v. Delano 76 is surely needlessly puzzling for a lower court;
and his opinion on the treatment of Negro firemen by their union slides
over the few points of moderate difficulty without much attempt to explain them.'" On the other hand, his opinion in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank,'78 on the requirement of notice in settling a common trust fund,
is outstanding, as is his O'Donnellv. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., involving the
7
Safety Appliance Act.

9

Justice Jackson's sternest critics cannot complain that he is unimaginative. Illustrations are his dissenting opinion in a case in which the majority approved the disbarment by the Patent Office of an attorney who
had planted a technical article under the signature of a purportedly impartial person and then cited it to the Patent Office as impartial evidence.
Justice Jackson thought this mere ghost writing, a practice so common
that the attorney could not be criticized for falling into it. 8 ° Another
illustration of the Justice's novelty of view is his dissent in a case reversing
'73 Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (I95O). The relevant passage of this per curiam order, described in note 142 supra, is as follows: "Mr. Justice Douglas joins the dissenting opinions of
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Jackson insofar as they hold
unconstitutional the portion of the oath dealing with beliefs, and being of the view that provisions of the oath are not separable votes to reverse. He therefore does not find it necessary to
reach the question of the constitutionality of the other part of the oath."
'74 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 422 (I95O) and quoted in
"Justice Jackson on Communications in America," N.Y. Times, Mag. Sec., p. 12 (May 21,

1950).

U.S. 725, 727 (I95O).
17 338 U.S. 226, 227 (1949).
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 233 (z949).
178339 U.S. 306, 307 (1950).
" 338 U.S. 384, 385 (1950).
ISO
Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 328, 320 (1949).
17S

'27

339
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a conviction where there had been racial discrimination in the selection of
a grand jury. The Jackson view was that so long as there was no discrimination at the jury trial stage, discrimination at the grand jury stage
was immaterial, thus in effect saying that grand juries are inconsequential.x8 '
The two worst handicaps which Justice Burton has had to battle as a
judge have been his tendencies both to prolixity and to fuzziness in opinions. His strong point is -notan instinct for the jugular, for the absolutely
vital point of a case.112 This year Justice Burton gained ground against
those handicaps. His opinion on interest calculations on funds taken up
by the Alien Property Custodian is very concise, and yet draws on general factors sufficiently to give full illumination to the discussion.5 Another fine example is a decision concerning veterans' seniority under the
Selective Service Act, carrying the law of that difficult and important
subject "one step further."'' s4 His opinion concerning the deportation of
denaturalized aliens who committed offenses during the period of their
citizenship, while criticized above on the merits, must receive respect for
its execution.'8 5 On the other hand, Savorgnan v. United States, holding,
perfectly unobjectionably, that an American citizen had lost her citizenship by becoming an Italian citizen, is prolix and is documented out of all
"
proportion to its negligible significance. 86
The two most important Burton opinions of the year were the dining
car segregation casel8 and the eminent domain case discussed above, in
which the government was held liable for damages resulting from raising
the stream level of a nonnavigable tributary of the Mississippi River.,,"
I have confessed my own difficulty in understanding the purpose of the
first half of that eminent domain opinion and just what it decides.
The trouble with thege technical considerations is that they take no
account of Burton's rugged independence and the integrity of his results.
Burton is basically conservative, and he behaves that way; but he cannot
be typed. In a half-dozen cases this year, he again illustrated the manner
z8 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298 (i95o).
8

z2

Discussion, 1948 Term article, 53-54.

183McGrath
184

v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 338 U.S.

241, 242

(1949).

Oakley v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 338 U.S. 278, 279 (1949).

8

s5United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521,

522 (1950).

x86338 U.S. 491, 492 (195o).
87 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 818 (1950).
188 United

States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 8oo (1950).
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in which he reached results which he may strongly have disliked x89 Burton never prates of impersonality, but he displays that characteristic in
marked degree.
The primary interest of the bar this year is of course in the work of the
two new Justices. Now that the first year's evidence is in, no very clearcut
conclusion can be reached as to the capacities of Justice Clark. His opinions are of average quality, neither particularly good nor bad. Probably

the poorest is United States v. Toronto Navigation Co., o0 involving the
valuation of a car ferry condemned by the government during the war.
The opinion is unnecessarily extensive in its statement of facts, verbose
in its description of the central issues, and unilluminating in the nature of
the directive which it sends to the court below. One of his best opinions is
Wilmetle ParkDistrictv. Campbell, discussing the application of an amusement tax to a local park district.' 9'
The principal criticism of the Clark opinions, like any other run of the
mine work, is that they were neither original nor penetrating. His cases
were decided in terms of the most obvious factors of the precedents or the

92
most clearly apparent materials. An illustration is Treickler v. Wisconsin,
Justice Clark's first opinion, which invalidates a provision of the Wisconsin inheritance tax law as it applies to the taxation of tangible property of
the deceased outside the state. Under a clear precedent, Frick v. Pennsylvania, 93 such a tax on out-of-state tangible property violates the due
process clause, and the Court so holds.
The opinion contains a most remarkable sentence: "[T]he economic
effects of tax burdens in the federal system cannot control our results,
limited as we are to the words of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' 94 The
law of due process on state taxation has never purported to be anything

189
For example, Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 498 (ig5o), holding
the Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to employees of private contractors operating government owned munitions plants on cost-plus contracts. I strongly doubt that Burton's inclinations took him to that result; but the law did. He also joined the majority in the following cases
which may have been personally difficult: Wong Yang Sung. v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)
(applicability of Administrative Procedure Act to deportations); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (195o) (tidelands); and particularly Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(195o) (service on foreign insurance companies with very thin connection of state of service).
In the so-called "patriotic cases" the Justice had a slight tendency to wave the flag and let the
eagle scream. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 337 (1946) (martial law in Hawaii);
Lichter v. United States, 3 34 U.S. 742, 778 et seq. (1948) (renegotiation). Elsewhere he retains
a very calm objectivity.
X0 338 U.S. 396, 397 (1949).
x9338 U.S. 4311, 412 (1949).
192338 U.S. 25r, 259 (1949).
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268 U.S. 473 (1925).
338 U.S. 251, 256 (z949).
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but a practical judicial adjustment of economic effects.'19 The Court reiterates the traditional "benefit theory" of taxation, resting its result on
the fact that Wisconsin gives no "benefit" in return for this tax on foreign
property. Yet a footnote concedes that the benefit theory would not be
applied if the physical property were abroad, and not in any state, for
"so to do would have placed a premium upon the avoidance of all state
taxes."'' 6 But this exception swallows the entire logic of the benefit theory
and suggests that it in turn is merely a legal way of talking about the
97
avoidance of double taxation.1
The point is that if a court were really "limited to the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment" which neither says anything about state taxation nor had any known historical intention in respect to state taxation,
one could not decide this case as Justice Clark decided it. There must be
some reasons why the Court has engrafted the tax limitation into the due
process clause. These reasons are obviously economic, though this is
denied; and statements suggesting what the reasons may be fit very
poorly together.
There is a similar mechanical quality in Manufacturers Trust Co. v.
Becker,""5 the bankruptcy case discussed above, which never quite touches
upon the fundamental difficulties of protecting shareholders while at
the same time not handicapping directors in their efforts to raise funds
for small corporations.
A Senator from Indiana, assistant to President Roosevelt, and a judge
of the seventh circuit for seven years, the new junior Justice, Sherman
Minton, brings to the Court a background of amazingly extensive experience. As a Senator he had been the New Deal whip, renowned for his
quickness of mind and tongue.
Justice Minton's first year must have brought him some genuine unhappiness. His oldest and warmest friend on the Court was Justice Black. His
admiration for Justice Douglas had been warmly and publicly expressed.
'9' A leading analysis, with comprehensive bibliography, is Bittker, Taxation of Out-ofState Tangible Property, 56 Yale L.J. 640 (i947).
196338 U.S. 251, 257 n.4 (1949).
'97 The Clark note cites Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (x9ii), holding taxable
a fleet of steamships owned by a Kentucky corporation, permanently employed on the high
seas. As Professor Bittker says, op: cit. supra note 195, at 645, "If the due process clause is
violated by a tax on railroad cars which receive no police or comparable protection from
Kentucky, how can an exception be found in the Fourteenth Amendment to support the
taxation of the Southern Pacific Company's ocean-going steamships? The fact that these
vessels receive no taxable 'protection' from their ports of enrollment or call in no way increases
the 'protection' afforded them by Kentucky."
,9$ 338 U.S. 304, 305 (i4).
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Nonetheless, he found himself intellectually in most extreme disagreement
with those old friends on fundamentals. Since of course he followed his
convictions rather than his affections, those differences were frequently
expressed.
The principal criticism of Minton's opinions is a marked tendency to
assume a point in issue. He retains a little of the legislator's tendency to
make a case easier than it is by stating the question so that it admits of
only one answer. For example, in one case the Court held that despite the
community property law of California, a service man could exclude his
wife as a beneficiary under a National Service Life Insurance policy. Justice Minton dissented, putting his position thus: "I cannot believe that
Congress intended to say to a serviceman, 'You may take your wife's
property and purchase a policy of insurance payable to your mother, and
we shall see that your defrauded wife gets none of the money.' ,99 No one
is very likely to doubt that Congress did not say "we will see that your
defrauded wife" really is defrauded.
Again, in a case involving the Labor Board's interpretation of an extremely obscure passage in its Act, Justice Minton begins his discussion
of the point with the words, "The claimed impotency of the contract as a
defense here rests not upon any provision of the Act of Congress or of state
law or the terms of the contract, but upon a policy declared by the Board."
We are then told that the policy of the Congress was different from the
policy of the Board, and that its "policy cannot be defeated by the Board's
policy.

'200

This makes the case too easy. Obviously if what the Board did really
does not rest "upon any provision of the Act of Congress," it cannot be
sustained. Equally clearly, the Board cannot substitute its policy for the
policy of Congress. The whole question of the case is, what is the policy
of Congress? That question remains inadequately analyzed.
This is the only serious criticism which can fairly be leveled at the
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 661, 663-64 (i95o).
-00Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355,362-63 (1949). Judge Learned Hand,
in an essay on his colleague, Judge Swan, said, in 57 Yale L.J. 167, 170 (1947): "In addition he
has-so far as it is given to any of us to have it-that merit which perhaps should rank highest
'99

in point of style: i.e. not to be misled into assuming the conclusion in the minor premise-not
to beg the question. I can think of no single fault that has done more to confuse the law
and to disseminate litigation. One would suppose that so transparent a logical vice would be
easily detected; but the offenders pass in troops before our eyes, bearing great names and distinguished titles. The truth is that we are all sinners; nobody's record is clean; and indeed it is
only fair to say that much of the very texture of the law invites us to sin, for it so often holds
out to us, as though they were objective standards, terms like 'reasonable care,' 'due notice,'
'reasonable restraint,' which are no more than signals that the dispute is to be decided with
moderation and without disregard of any of the interests at stake."
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technical aspect of the Minton opinions. There is much to praise. The
opinions are very much to the point, and leave no doubt for the lower
courts as to what they are supposed to do. Minton is said by friends to
have brought to the Court a determination not to write for the ages, but
rather to decide the cases dearly and let it go at that. This he does. His
best opinion of the year is United States v. Rabinowitz,201 which, overruling
an earlier opinion on searches and seizures, does so with great care and
precision. Other outstanding Minton opinions are his majority and dis2 02
senting analyses in the two picketing cases in which he wrote.

CONCLUSION

The new directions of 1949-5o have been discussed. One point remains.

There has been some criticism of the new Court for the rapidity with
which it abandoned what its predecessors stood for. In the Rabinowitz
case just referred to, Justice Frankfurter strenuously criticized the Court
for its overruling of a case only two years old:
Respect for continuity in law, where reasons for change are wanting, alone requires
adherence to Trupiano and the other decisions. Especially ought the Court not reenforce needlessly the instabilities of our day by giving fair ground for the belief that Law
is the expression of chance-for instance, of unexpected changes in the Court's com203
position and the contingencies in the choice of successors.

The criticism seems unfair. We cannot escape the fact that in the highest Court, the law is necessarily what the judges say it is and basic changes
of personnel inevitably bring changes of doctrine and theory. It is perfectly fitting that this should be so. President Roosevelt is dead. lis
choices of Justices could not last forever. A new President having been
elected, it is to be expected that the Court should adjust to new ways. As

a result, the New Deal era in jurisprudence is gone. Those of us who regret
the passing of the Roosevelt era from the Supreme Court can do so on far

stronger ground than a mere attachment for stare decisis. We have all too
much to lament on the merits.
APPENDIX
The list following is an illustrative sampling of certioraris denied.
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES

(a) No. io, Misc., Snell v. Mayo, 173 F. 2d 704 (C.A. 5th, 1949). Defendant,
held incommunicado ten days, attempted suicide; while weak from loss of blood,
201 339 U.S. 56, 57 (1950).

2oBuilding Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 533 (1950) (majority); Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481 (195o) (dissent).
203 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950).
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he allegedly made certain statements which sheriff overheard and repeated in
court. The lower court held that "the confession or admission testified to by the
sheriff was overheard and not extorted."
(b) Nos. 221-222, Misc., In the matter of Marino, 404 111. 35, 88 N.E. 2d 7, 8
(1949). Two years ago the United States Supreme Court held that Marino, a
recent immigrant who spoke no English and who was tried for a serious offense
without an adequate interpreter and without counsel, had been denied due
process. Illinois, the state of his conviction, confessed error. The lower court in
Illinois nonetheless, on remand, refused to release him in an unreported decision. The Supreme Court then denied certiorari. The matter then proceeded
to the Illinois Supreme Court, which in the case cited conceded that it was res
adjudicata that "defendant was denied 'the due process of law which the i4th
Amendment requires' "-but found that it was powerless to take any action.
The Supreme Court again denied certiorari.
(c) No. 387, 388, Misc., Ex parte Quillian,89 N.E. 2d 493, 494 (Ohio, 1949).
Escaped prisoners held to have no right to raise issues of fairness of trial on extradition proceedings. justice Douglas dissented from the denial.
(d) No. 255, Hallv. United States, 176 F. 2d 163 (C.A. 2d, 1949). Communist
defendants, held in contempt for disturbance in open court; unusual penalty
assessed. justice Black dissented from this denial.
(e) No. 168-i69, International Union, UMW v. United States, 177 F. 2d 29
(App. D.C., 1949). Fines double those of the earlier United Mine Workers case
were assessed for contempt of district court's no-strike order. It was alleged, in
part, that these fines had now become so enormous as to be a cruel and unusual
punishment. justices Black, Reed, and Douglas dissented from the denial of
the writ, and justice Clark did not participate.
(f) No. 43o , United States ex rel. Mobley v. Handy, 176 F. 2d 491 (C.A. 5th,
1949). The issue was whether the Army could arrest a civilian in Texas who had
allegedly, as a civilian in Germany, escaped after being under arrest in Germany. The fifth circuit denied habeas corpus.
(g) No. 398, Pedigo v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 371, 392, 493, 499, 514, 54 S.E.
2d 221 et seq. (1949). Alleged contempt of injunction restraining mass picketing.
Justice Black dissented from the denial of certiorari.
(h) No. 5og, Buteau v. Connecticut, 136 Conn. 113, 68 A. 2d 681 (1949),
validity of confession in case in which defendant was held illegally for seven
days in a police barracks, the state court finding, however, that "every consideration was shown to the defendant which one arrested for a first degree
murder could have reasonably expected."
(i) No. 494, Schoeps v. Landon, 177 F. 2d 391 (C.A. 9th, 1949), a one day trip
from California to Mexico and return held to amount to an "entry" under a
criminal provision of the immigration laws, although the alien making the excursion had lived here twenty years. (It may be observed that he was an obscenely unpleasant alien.)
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(j) Nos. 197, 248, and 249 [see 176 F. 2d 473 (App. D.C., 1949)], Marshall,
Lawson & Trumbo v. UnitedStates. The congressional authorization of the House
Un-American Committee, and its works, held lawful. Justices Black and
Douglas dissented.
(k) No. 284, Lapides v. McGrath, 176 F. 2d 619 (APP.D.C., 1949), a statute
providing that naturalized citizens shall lose their citizenship upon five years
residence abroad held valid as against challenge that it makes an unconstitutional distinction between naturalized and native-born citizens.
The foregoing cases all involved refusals to hear cases at the behest of the
individual whose liberties had allegedly been invaded. In No. 300, Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show, 67 A. 2d 497, 509 (1949), the Court declined to review
a Maryland decision which reversed a contempt order of a trial court against a
local radio station. Justice Frankfurter filed an extended statement concerning
this matter.
NONCIVIL RIGHTS CASES

(a) No. 92, Turner Glass Corp. v. HartfordEmpire Co., 173 F.

2d

49 (C.A. 7th,

1949). The lower court held that a licensee of patent rights under a system of

agreements held to be illegal in a suit between the United States and the
licensor could not recover the amount of the license fees paid in the absence of
showing special damages. Justice Black dissented from the denial.
(b) No. 331, Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., 175 F. 2d 427 (C.A. 7 th,
1949). The lower court held that the Supreme Court's so-called "flash of genius"
test was not meant to raise the level of invention in any way.
(c) No. 488, National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 175 F. 2d 686 (C.A. 2d,
1949). Taft-Hartley anti-hiring hall provisions held valid.
(d) No. 358, Casselman v. Idaho, 69 Idaho 237, 205 P. 2d 1131 (1949). Idaho
secondary boycott act held valid. Justices Black, Reed and Burton dissented
from the denial of certiorari.
(e) No. 4oo, Fifth and Walnut v. Loew's, Inc., 176 F. 2d 587 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
The judgment in United States v. Paramount was held not "final" and hence
not usable in evidence under the Clayton Act in the many movie treble damage cases.
(f) Nos. 592, 593, United States v. Pevely DairyCo., 178 F. 2d 363 (C.A. 8th,
1949). Evidence held insufficient to sustain conviction of defendants for
monopolizing milk sales in the St. Louis area.
(g) No. 653, Stone v. Reichman-Crosby Co., (Miss., Nov., 1949). The Mississippi Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the state's use tax requiring
non-resident seller to collect tax from Mississippi customers.

